Violence beyond cartels: How militias impact violence in Mexico by Pedrero, Bernardo Miranda
Leiden University 
 
Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences 
Institute of Political Science 
Master of Science in International Relations and Diplomacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Violence Beyond Cartels 
How Militias Impact Violence in Mexico 
 
Bernardo Miranda Pedrero                                                                                                                                                   
S1433040 
Leiden, June 10 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Reader: Dr. Corinna Jentzsch                                                                                                              
Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Madeleine Hosli  
 
1 
 
Abstract 
 
Although levels of violence in Mexico have generally decreased, since 2013 many self-defense groups 
have emerged across the country. Yet, little is known about the impact these militias have on levels of 
criminal violence. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the impact militias 
have on violence outside civil wars. Through a case study comparing two sta tes in Mexico where self-
defense groups have gained importance, this thesis aims to uncover whether the development of self-
defense groups in the states of Michoacán and Guerrero has impacted the levels and types of violence 
during 2013-2014. Self-defense groups are found to indirectly impact violence in Mexico. Defensive 
violence by self-defense forces has partially interrupted the illicit activities of drug trafficking 
organizations in the areas under the control of self-defense groups. Self-defense groups played a crucial 
role in urging the government to take swift action; hence, their presence can cause more enforcement 
violence. Together enforcement and defensive violence can diminish the capabilities of drug trafficking 
organizations and thus lead to competitive violence between drug cartels. While the cooperation of 
government and militia can be helpful, a lasting peace can only be achieved if drug trafficking 
organizations stop competing for control over lucrative illicit businesses. 
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1. Introduction   
 
 Since 1961, the United States and the United Nations (UN) have implemented several 
conventions to criminalize the production, transportation, and consumption of narcotics on a global 
scale. This approach has focused mainly on combating the supply of narcotics. This strategy is based 
on the idea that prohibiting narcotics will cause an increase in price, making drugs less affordable, 
thereby reducing demand for the various products (UNODC 2009). However, this strategy has not been 
as successful as its founding members hoped. Neither the price nor the demand for narcotics has 
significantly decreased (UNODC 2014). Many have denounced the consequences this strategy has had 
on various areas across societies, from the increasing levels of violence to the impact it has had on 
public security (Reuter 2008).  
 Mexico experienced a sudden increase in rates of homicide since 2006, when former president 
Felipe Calderon decided to make the combat against drug cartels the defining policy of his presidency. 
Violence has become more gruesome. There has been a surge in public assassinations that have become 
increasingly grotesque; extortions, kidnappings, and an unprecedented impunity for criminals have 
become the norm. Not only have the types of violence become more appalling but also more frequent;  
the number of homicides attributed to criminal organizations rose from over 2,000 in 2006 to over 
15,000 in 2010 reaching its peak in 2011 with almost 17,000 drug-related homicides (SESNSP 2015). 
Additionally, thousands of people have gone missing. According to one estimate 26,000 people have 
disappeared since Calderon took office (Heinle, Molzahn and Shirk 2015a, 19).  
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 Figure 1: National Homicide Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants) for Selected Latin American 
Countries in 2012 
 Source: UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2014 
 
 Some have seen the recent escalation of violence in Mexico as a process of Latin American 
“naturalization” (Azaola 2012; Bergman 2012). The levels of homicides in Mexico per 100,000 
inhabitants was 21 in 2012, close to the Latin American average of 16 homicides per 100,000 people 
(see figure 1) (OAS 2012). This has led some officials and scholars to denunciate the overemphasis of 
the international community and the media on violence in Mexico, arguing that the violence is part of a 
wider phenomenon that encapsulates the entire region (see figure 2) (Heinle, Rodriguez Ferreira, and 
Shirk 2013). Yet, this understanding of the levels of violence depends on what is accepted as “normal”. 
According to the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), in 2013, 36% of world 
homicides took place in the Americas, where only 8% of the world population resides (UNODC 2014, 
11). Even if current levels of violence across the Americas are a part of a “structural” change, it is 
important to understand the mechanisms that can best explain the recent upsurge of violence in 
Mexico. Only by understanding the underlying mechanisms that lead to more or less violence can the 
government implement reliable and efficient policies to counter violence.  
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Figure 2: Homicide Rates at the National Level, Selected Countries, by Sub-Region 
 (2012 or latest year) 
 
 Although some novel attempts exist that combine criminal sociology and political science to 
study riots, protest, crime, and assassinations (e.g. Grahamond and Gurr 1969, Gurr 1989), scholars of 
conflict have largely neglected the study of criminal organizations and the impact they might have on 
the escalation of violence. Scholars of conflict have mainly focused on understanding political 
violence, neglecting criminal violence, as this is considered non-political in nature (Sambanis 2004). 
However, organized crime poses a challenge to the political order of many states, sometimes leading to 
the collapse of order in certain regions (Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008). Understanding the 
mechanisms that drive criminal violence can help governments across the world overcome the endemic 
challenges that criminal organizations pose to the status-quo and the social order of nations.  
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 This thesis contributes to the study of the micro-dynamics of conflict. Instead of focusing on the 
analysis of violence against civilians during civil wars (Kalyvas 2006; Valentino 2014; Hultman 2014), 
the emphasis here is on the impact that civilian populations may have on levels and types of violence. 
Through a case study comparing two states in Mexico where self -defense groups have gained 
importance, this thesis aims to uncover whether the development of self-defense groups in the states of 
Michoacán and Guerrero has impacted the levels and types of violence during 2013-2014.  
 Criminal organizations are understood “as a set of stable, hierarchically organized groups of 
criminals with the ability to use violence – or the [credible] threat of it – for acquiring or defending 
control of illegal markets in order to extract economic benefits from them” (Osorio 2013, 22). This 
definition distinguishes between individuals that sporadically engage in criminal behavior and criminal 
organizations that systematically conduct illicit activities. The literature differentiates criminal 
organizations from insurgents or rebels in civil wars because their main goal is economic rather than 
political in nature.1 Furthermore, it is understood that criminals do not attempt to change the status quo, 
but rather employ violence to maintain the status quo, which has allowed them to profit illicit business 
(Blattmann and Miguel 2010).  
 The increase in Mexico's levels of violence has been attributed to a specific group of criminal 
organizations, drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)2. These DTOs have not only been fighting the 
government, but also other DTOs and the civilian population in order to profit from illicit activities 
(Alvarez Cervantes et al. 2014; Dickenson 2014). DTOs primarily focus on the growing, 
manufacturing, transportation, distribution, and marketing of substances that are subject to drug 
prohibition laws (UNODC 2013). Yet, DTOs also engage in other illicit activities such as extortions, 
money laundering, kidnapping, or weapon smuggling, but these activities are seen as secondary and 
usually undertaken to reinforce or compensate drug trafficking (Osorio 2013).  
 
 
                                                                 
1  There are instances in which rebels during a civil  war seem to be more like rent-seeking, economically motivated 
actors with an opportunity to loot. This predatory behavior by some rebel groups has been the main argument for ma ny 
scholars that dismiss grievances or political objectives as the main motivation of rebels (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler  
2004). Grossman (1999, 269) has gone as far as stating that “insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates”.   
2   DTOs, criminal organizations, criminal groups, and drug cartels will  be used interchangeably for referring to drug 
trafficking organizations. 
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2. Background Literature  
2.1. Defining Mexico's Conflict 
 
 While Mexico is not witnessing a civil war, criminal organizations challenge the state's  
monopoly on the use of force in some regions of the country, just as rebels do during intrastate 
conflicts. However, rebels, DTOs, and self-defense groups attempt to obtain control of the means of 
coercion for different reasons. Rebels usually attempt to change the status quo to benefit politically or 
economically. Criminal organizations aim to maintain the status quo that has allowed them to conduct 
their illicit activities, or challenge the status quo of regions where competing DTOs have more 
influence (Osorio 2013). Self-defense forces attempt to bring back stability to a region, thus they 
attempt to change the status quo, but only in so far as to expel DTOs and corrupt officials from the 
territory. To better understand the mechanisms that can explain how DTOs, the government, and self-
defense forces impact levels and types of violence in Mexico, first a discussion on the similarities and 
differences between criminal violence and civil war violence will help frame the analysis around t he 
existing conflict literature.  
 Most of the literature bases the definition of civil war on the classical Weberian notion of the 
sovereign state: “[…] the state is that human community which within a defined territory successfully 
claims for itself the monopoly of legitimate physical force; and 'territory' […] is characteristic of the 
state […] The state is the sole source for the 'right' to exercise violence” (Weber 2004, 131 -132). Thus, 
the formation of the state has been connected with the control of the means of coercion in order to 
impose order within a given territory. However, the state is not always able to maintain this monopoly. 
According to Tilly (1992, 15-17), the extent of domination and order is defined by those who control 
the means of coercion. Those who apply coercion on others attain their compliance, and through that 
compliance they draw multiple political and economic benefits that are unavailable to the less powerful 
(Tilly 1992). As Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud (2008) argue, violence is not only used by the 
authorities to maintain their privileged position, it is also used by those who want to overthrow the 
existing order. DTOs and rebels in civil wars challenge the state's monopoly over the use of force in 
different ways. While rebels challenge the status quo, criminal organizations use force to maintain the 
existing order (Osorio 2013). Both aims have important implications for the levels of violence in states. 
Hence, understanding the violence related to criminal organizations may be equally important as 
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understanding civil war violence.  
 Definitions of parties in civil wars share the following aspects: parties are (1) politically 
organized, (2) engage in sustained large scale physically armed confrontation (3) within the boundaries 
of a state, aiming to control the monopoly of physical force (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013; Sambanis 
2004); (4) groups have to be numerically significant (at least enough to challenge the government on its 
monopoly on the use of force), and their goals must be  credible (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013). In 
addition, most scholars agree, that numerically, (5) civil wars are those internal civil conflicts that 
count more than 1,000 battle deaths per year, with at least 50 -100 battle deaths on each side (Blattmann 
and Miguel 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoefler 2003). By and large, there is consensus 
that “[a] civil war is not just a sufficiently large group of people over a sufficiently long time period 
who make trouble for the government and undermine security, such as large drug cartels, because they 
do not aim to possess the monopoly of force” (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013,161). While DTOs do not 
aim to challenge the state on the monopoly of the use of force across the entire territory, criminal 
organizations resemble rebels in other ways.     
 First, although Mexican drug cartels are not politically organized, they have a strong element of 
hierarchical organization, allowing DTOs to solve collective action problems and to coordinate 
members to conduct violence and engage in illegal activities. Lichbach (1998, 20 -21) identified two 
mechanisms that solve the collective action problems of rebels; rebels engage in market mechanisms 
whereby they rely on economic incentives to motivate members. Additionally the use of hierarchical 
structures that helps monitor and enforce agreements within lower ranks, also solves collective action 
problems. Criminal groups engage in both of these mechanisms to motivate and control members 
(Osorio 2013, 18).  
 Second, DTOs engage in sustained and large-scale physical armed confrontations not only 
against government forces, but also against other DTOs, and even against the civilian population 
(Alvarez Cervantes et al. 2014). Third, partially due to the endemic weakness of police force s, and the 
high levels of corruption, Mexico's government has deployed its military forces to patrol the streets and 
combat organized crime within its territory (Guerrero 2011). Fourth, due to the vast economic 
resources that drug cartels are able to extract, DTOs can recruit support to effectively resist state forces. 
Finally, the war on drugs in Mexico has reached a level of lethality that would satisfy most definitions 
of civil war.  
 Criminal violence, and violence perpetrated by rent-seeking rebels during civil wars is similar, 
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yet conflict literature has largely neglected the study of criminal violence, primarily because DTOs do 
not aim at altering the status quo. However, drug cartels across Mexico have infiltrated all levels of 
social, economic, and political activities (Carpenter 2010, 405). Through bribes and extortion, cartels 
across the country have been able to influence politicians (Birns and Sanchez 2007, 1). Even though 
DTOs do not attempt to seize political power but attempt to maintain the status quo, which allows them 
to conduct their illicit activities through violence, criminal organizations engage in acts of violence just 
like rebels do during civil wars (Osorio 2013). These criminal organizations do not only profit by 
selling illegal drugs; they have extended their business model to all areas of the economy, from the sale 
of natural resources to the collection of “rent” payments from the local population for “protection” 
(Birns and Sanchez 2007). 
 Mexico is not going through a conventional civil war, despite engaging in a 'war on drugs'. War 
can take many forms and be perpetrated by different actors. However, the levels of violence seen in 
Mexico throughout the past decade or so, resemble levels of violence found in civil wars. Furthermore, 
the criminal actors in Mexico's drug war are well-organized, engage in large-scale sustained physical 
force against the state's military forces, and are able to recruit supporters. However, unlike rebels, 
DTOs are not usually ideologically motivated. Government can afford to relinquish certain powers to 
criminals without losing complete control of the areas, as their motive is not to change the status quo. 
In contrast, governments that see a challenge from rebels must take a proactive stance, since the goal of 
rebels is to supplant the government. Hence, the level and type of violence is directly affected by the 
perceived challenge the state identifies (Staniland 2015). The government of Felipe Calderon (2006 -
20012) decided to take a proactive stance against DTOs, resembling strategies taken by governments 
during civil wars. As discussed, Mexico is not witnessing a civil war, but the overlap of the type of 
violence that results from the underlying conditions of the war on drugs makes it helpful to frame the 
levels of violence in the light of an intrastate war.  
 
2.2. Militia Violence  
 
 Clearly, there are similarities between the violent behavior of rent-seeking rebels and Mexican 
DTOs. However, the uprising self-defense groups are actors that should not be overlooked. By framing 
the current crisis in Mexico in the civil war literature, this thesis will draw inferences from the limited 
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literature on militia violence, to better understand the impact self-defense groups might have on levels 
and types of violence. This is important because while the impact that predatory armed groups have on 
violence are widely discussed, little is known about the role self-defense groups have on levels of 
violence in a conflict, especially outside the civil war context.  
 Militias can be hard to identify and define. Different types of militias exist, ranging from pro -
incumbent to pro-insurgent, with formal, semi-formal or informal ties to either party of the conflict 
(Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014). For the purpose of this thesis, self-defense groups will be defined in 
line with civil-defense units, which “constitute pro-incumbent militias that harness the active 
participation of civilians and defected members of the [criminal] insurgency in the counterinsurgency 
efforts, taking up intelligence security, and limited combat roles” (Clayton and Thomson 2014, 922). 
This kind of militia is usually sedentary, and does “not actively seek to engage or 'neutralize' insurgents 
and their civilian sympathizers” (Clayton and Thomson 2014, 922). This definition does not imply that 
militias have to be pro-incumbent at the time of formation, but rather that in the long-term they will 
fight alongside government forces. 
 Some literature that attempts to understand the effects militias have on levels of violence 
emphasizes the principal-agent logic (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014), whereby the principal 
(government) delegates the perpetration of acts of violence to the agent (militias). The argument 
stipulates that since the principal can formally or informally recruit militias to perpetrate the most 
gruesome acts of war, the government will be able to escape national and international accountability 
(Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014). Governments may not want to outsource the use of violence to 
militias, but may rather be unable to control them. Both, outsourcing the use of force or the lack of 
control over militias have been connected to higher levels of human rights abuses and general levels of 
violence in civil wars (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014). 
 Militias may however also have an effect on levels of violence because the formation of civil -
defense units “effectively refocus[es] the primary target of insurgent violence from the incumbent 
forces to civilians” (Clayton and Thomson 2014, 921). This, together with an increase in 
counterinsurgency efforts leads to a temporary increase in the levels of violence in the regions where 
civil-defense units are present (Clayton and Thomson 2014). The type of violence might be influenced 
by the presence of militias as well (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015). Militias can help 
governments move from indiscriminate violence to more selective violence, since they usually have 
access to high-quality local knowledge, as they usually operate within a given area (Kalyvas 2006, 107; 
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Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015).  
 Internal characteristics of militias might help explain how militias engage in different levels of 
violence. Some authors have emphasized the organizational structure of militias to explain the variety 
of violence perpetrated by militias. Cohen and Nordȧs (2015) examine the effects recruitment methods 
of militias might have on levels of violence. They find that militias that forcefully recruit (children) are 
more likely to perpetrate acts of sexual violence. They argue that because forced recruitment leads to 
lower internal cohesion in militias, sexual violence is used as a bonding mechanism between the 
members of the group.  
 Stanton (2015, 2), finds that internal characteristics of militia’s best explain the likelihood that 
they will engage in acts of violence. However, for Stanton (2015, 3) it is not the recruitment methods 
that best explain acts of violence, but the target group for mobilization; apparently militias that recruit 
from the same group as insurgents are less likely to engage in violent acts since this would mean that 
they are violating their own people (Stanton 2015, 3).  
 
2.3. Violence in Mexico 
 
 Scholars that attempt to understand the increasing levels of violence in Mexico have by and 
large overlooked the impact self-defense groups might have on levels of violence. Most scholars 
attribute the escalation of the conflict to the military and law enforcement approach pursued by the 
Mexican government of arresting and extraditing cartel leaders (Bergman 2012). Apparently the 
capture or termination of cartel leaders brings about internal fractionalization of the groups, leaving 
contenders fighting each other to fill the artificially created power vacuum. This group disintegration 
has led to the application of harsher tactics to portray overall strength, and to deter would -be-
challengers. Most scholars see this strategy as having a negative effect on the levels of violence in 
Mexico (e.g. Dickenson 2014).  
 The strategy implemented by Calderon has led to a decay of public support for state institutions. 
According to Schedler (2013, 2), the Mexican government has been: 
Bolstering the security apparatus without strengthening the justice system, drawing the military 
into police functions without subjecting it to oversight, chasing down cartel leaders without 
dismantling cartel networks, pursuing drug trafficking while giving traffickers a license to kill 
each other, conducting massive arrests of suspected criminals while lacking the capacity of 
subjecting them to fair and effective trials, seeking mass confiscations of drug money and arms 
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while lacking serious strategies against money laundering and the importation of arms. 
 
The government’s inability or unwillingness to protect its citizens has caused violence to spread 
beyond the government and the criminal organizations, drawing the civilian population into the war on 
drugs.  
 Osorio (2013) attributes the escalation of violence not only to the government, but also, to the 
democratization process that has taken place since 2000 when the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI) lost the first national elections in 70 years. This led to the 
erosion of the “peaceful configurations between the state and cr iminal organizations motivat[ing] 
politicians to fight crime, thus triggering a wave of violence between the state and organized criminals 
and among rival criminal groups fighting to control valuable territories” (Osorio 2013, 5). 
 Others have emphasized economic and social causes to explain the increased levels of violence 
in Mexico. Vilalta (2012) attributes this increase to the rupture of institutional and social norms. This 
rupture has led to an increasing number of citizens engaging in criminal activit ies in order to gain 
economic benefits, which in turn has led to more violence (Vilalta 2012).  
Several mechanisms have been identified that can help explain the rapid escalation of violence 
levels in Mexico. Government policies, democratization, social and economic factors seem to be 
associated with the increased levels of violence in Mexico. These mechanisms might be related to the 
onset of self-defense forces in Mexico. However, except for the social and economic motivations for 
joining DTOs, the literature has largely neglected the impact that the civilian population might have on 
levels of violence. This is perhaps because the first self-defense groups in Mexico formed in 2013, and 
prior to the exponential escalations of self-defense forces, the civilian population was seen as a 
bystander in the conflict. Or perhaps it has been so because the central government has been reluctant 
to allow armed self-defense groups to freely operate throughout the country, for fear of further 
escalation of violence, and thus self-defense groups have had short, yet influential life spans. Either 
way, since enforcing Calderon's strategy to combat organized crime, revenue from the sale of drugs has 
dropped, leading to the escalation of drug-related violence in order to extract economic resources 
(Alvarez Cervantes et al. 2014). The targets of violence have slowly shifted from the government and 
various DTOs to the civilian population. Therefore, to better understand the dynamics behind the levels 
of violence in Mexico, the impact of self-defense groups is an important variable that must be 
accounted for (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015). To better understand the potential impact self -
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defense groups have on levels on violence in Mexico, this thesis will closely analyze whether the 
development of self-defense groups in the states of Michoacán and Guerrero had an impact on the 
levels and types of  violence in those states during 2013-2014. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
 Societal violence has many forms and is understood in different ways, from extortion,  
kidnappings, and homicides, to torture. Violence emerges as a consequence of the collapse of order. 
Yet, violence is not the same as conflict; violence is the result of a social, political, and economic 
process. It is a particular form of resolving a conflict, which has important implications on how 
conflicts develop and are resolved (Bergman 2012). In general, violence is endogenous; it is the cause 
as well as the consequence. According to Osorio (2013, 24), “violence refers to the deliberate infliction 
of physical harm on people or damage on their property that can be inflicted for either tactical reasons 
– to eliminate a specific group – or strategic motivations – to prevent certain behavior.” In order to 
disentangle the forces that lead to the escalation of levels of violence in Mexico it is necessary to 
understand the different components of violence in the country.  
 For the purpose of this thesis, violence will be understood in line with Osorio’s (2013,24) 
definition of drug-related violence, as “violence perpetrated either by DTOs, the state security forces, 
[or by self-defense group members], when conducting [pro or] anti-criminal activities.” In line with 
Kalyvas’ (2006) discussion on violence, this broad definition of drug-related violence is based on the 
rationalist perspective, which understands violence as a strategic calculation by those that perpetrate it. 
Although there are other types of intentional homicides that take place outside of wars (such as 
interpersonal and socio-political homicides), the emphasis of this thesis is to understand the increase in 
levels of violence in Mexico, which have been associated with criminal activities throughout the 
literature (UNODC 2014, 39). Drug-related violence will be used, primarily because data on drug-
related homicides is readily available, whereas other types of criminal violence are not (Heinle, 
Molzahn, and Shirk 2015a). Given the available data, drug-related homicides are the best proxy to help 
understand the impact self-defense groups might have on levels of violence in Michoacán and 
Guerrero. However, to better understand the impact self-defense groups have on the underlying 
dynamics of all types of violence, intentional homicides, recorded by government officials, will also be 
used. 
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3.1. Self-Defense Groups' Impact on Types of Violence  
 
 According to Osorio (2013, 6), law enforcement by state forces in Mexico led to violent 
confrontations with drug cartels, inviting retaliation against state forces by DTOs, which allowed other 
DTOs to challenge the weakened criminal organizations and compete for a given territory. Thus, in the 
Mexican context, drug-related violence has been differentiated into three different categories: 
enforcement, retaliation, and competition (Osorio 2013, 24-25). Enforcement refers to the coercive use 
of force by state authorities taken against DTOs (or self-defense groups) to enforce the law. This type 
of violence is grounded in political motivations to change the status quo of the area where criminal 
groups operate. Retaliation is the “deliberate use of violence by members of drug trafficking 
organizations against state security forces or government authorities” (Osorio 2013, 25). In contrast to 
enforcement, this type of violence aims to preserve the power structures that allow DTOs to conduct 
illicit activities in a given area. Both of these types of violence impact competition violence. 
Competitive violence refers to “acts of violence perpetrated by members of a crimina l organization 
against members of other criminal organization” (Osorio 2013, 25) to alter the power structures of a 
territory. These types of violence have spread beyond government forces and criminal organization 
members, to reach the civilian population in many areas of Mexico. 
 A fourth type of violence that has taken place in Mexico has been largely overlooked by 
political scientists studying violence in Mexico, namely violence against the civilian population. Even 
though much of this violence is non-lethal, it has impacted the willingness of citizens to take up arms 
to defend themselves. Clearly civilians play a crucial role in civil wars. They are the main targets of 
indiscriminate and sometimes selective violence (Kalyvas 2006).  
Criminal organizations engage in indiscriminate acts of violence against the civilian population, 
creating resentment and frustration. This is especially true when the government is unwilling or unable 
to protect civilians and the rebels or criminal organizations do not rely o n civilian support for their 
survival (Weinstein 2007), as is the case in Mexico. This has led communities to take matters into their 
own hands, rising up against the criminal organizations creating their own militias. The violence 
derived from self-defense groups can be described as defensive.  
Militia involvement can not only increase or decrease the levels of violence in a conflict, but  
can also impact the type of violence found (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015). However, the span 
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of defensive violence is limited; local populations conduct defensive violence in order to defend or 
deter criminal organizations from entering a given territory. The main aim of this type of violence is to 
bring back order to areas that have been controlled by DTOs, or to protect areas that are at risk of 
becoming prey to coercive violence perpetrated by predatory criminals.   
In addition to defensive violence, the appearance of self-defense groups can lead to two more 
types of violence – reprisal and predominance violence. Reprisal violence occurs when DTOs conduct 
violence against self-defense which may be risking an alteration to the status-quo that has allowed 
DTOs to profit from illegal activities. Finally, self-defense forces might fight each other for the control 
of a given territory, this type of violence is called predominance violence, and it aims at altering the 
status quo of a region where self-defense forces have established a stronghold. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the types of violence present in Mexico today.  
Table 1 – Types of Violence in the Mexican Conflict 
Types of Violence  Actors  Impact on Status Quo Impact on Monopoly 
of Force 
Enforcement  Gov. vs DTOs or Self-defense  Change  Change – Government  
Retaliation DTOs vs Gov. Remain Remain - DTOs 
Competition DTOs vs DTOs Change Change – other DTOs 
Defensive Self-defense vs DTOs Change Change – Self-defense  
Reprisal DTOs vs Self-defense  Remain  Remain – DTOs 
Predominance  Self-defense vs Self-defense  Change  Change - Self-defense  
Source: Osorio 2013 
The defensive actions taken by self-defense groups force the government to take a stance, either 
supporting the actions of self-defense forces or suppressing them. Additionally, if self-defense forces 
are successful in expelling criminal members and bringing back order to the region, other DTOs might 
see an opportunity, which can lead to violence because of competition. Hence, defensive violence 
perpetrated by self-defense force might have an impact on all types of violence, which can lead to 
higher or lower levels of violence. Whether the impact self-defense groups have on the levels of 
violence is positive or negative largely depends on the way militias interact with the government, and 
the effect this cooperation has on the capabilities of DTOs (Staniland 2015). 
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3.2 Self-Defense Groups' Impact on Levels of Violence  
 
 There are five main aspects of self-defense groups that can help explain a change in levels of 
violence. The government outsourcing the use of force to self-defense groups, DTOs shifting the target 
from the government and other DTOs to the self-defense groups, the gathering of highly accurate 
information by self-defense forces so the government can target criminals more selectively, and the 
recruitment methods and target group for mobilization of self-defense forces. Beyond the fact that self-
defense members usually engage in acts of defensive violence, these aspects of self -defense groups 
might also have an impact on the levels and types of violence that are perpetrated by all parties.   
Outsourced use of force and negligence (Outsource/Negligence): Democratic governments are 
accountable to the people and therefore cannot engage in indiscriminate acts of violence against the 
people. Thus, in some cases governments outsource the use of force to militias to evade accountability. 
If this is the case in Mexico, the presence of militias may lead to higher levels of violence since they 
might be used as a strategic form of outsourced violence by the state (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 
2014). However, governments may also be unwilling or unable to control the actions of militias. Such 
government negligence has been associated with an increase in levels of violence (Mitchell, Carey, and 
Butler 2014). Either way, if the government endorses or neglec ts the defensive violence of self-defense 
forces, the types of violence might also be affected. Outsourcing or negligence implies that self-defense 
forces would engage DTOs, which in turn might lead to reprisals against self-defense members or to 
predominance violence with various self-defense groups fighting each other for control of a given 
territory. Together reprisal and predominance violence can give place to competition violence, where 
other DTOs see an opportunity to control a territory given the weakened capabilities of all parties in the 
region.   
 Refocus on civilians (Shift): Militias (self-defense forces) have been found to refocus the target 
of insurgents (in the case of Mexico criminal organizations) from the state to the civilians (Clayton and 
Thomson 2014). Even if self-defense groups are not pro-government, but merely anti-insurgents, if 
civilians take a confrontational approach, it can lead to criminals refocusing their military efforts to 
defeating the self-defense forces, leading to higher levels of violence. Additionally, the shift of focus 
can also impact the types of violence. Self-defense forces will defend themselves from the attacks of 
DTOs. Furthermore, while DTOs are occupied with confrontations against self -defense forces, the 
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government, other self-defense groups, and other DTOs can take advantage of the weakened 
capabilities of the criminal organization and the self-defense group in order to engage in enforcement, 
predominance, or competition violence.  
 Information to the state (Information): Militias may aid counterinsurgency efforts, as they have 
valuable local knowledge and can collect intelligence for the state (Kalyvas 2006). This information 
can enable the state to use selective violence as opposed to indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2006). 
Armed with high quality knowledge the state can target the combatants more effectively, thus reducing 
the numbers of collateral damage (Peic 2014). Enabling the government to target criminals more 
effectively, can increase or decrease levels of violence, depending on what the government does with 
the information. If the government decides to take extensive action against DTOs then it might lead to 
an increase in the levels of violence. However, if the government targets only the most important 
players in the conflict, the provision of information can lower levels of violence, at least in the short 
term. The types of violence can also be influenced through this gathering of information. Enforcement 
efforts might increase, leading to retaliation perpetrated by DTOs against the state or reprisal against 
self-defense forces. Enforcement can also lead to competition violence, if other DTOs see an 
opportunity to exploit.  
 Recruitment methods: Forcefully recruited militias can use acts of violence against civilians as a 
type of bonding mechanism to create more internal cohesion (Cohen and Nordȧs 2015). If self-defense 
members are recruited forcefully this could lead to higher levels of violence in the region. If this is the 
case, in order to maintain control of the monopoly on the use of force, the government’s enforcement 
efforts and DTOs' capabilities might refocus to target self-defense forces, depending on who controls 
the territory prior to the appearance of self-defense forces. Additionally, since the goal of self-defense 
groups should be to protect the civilian population, other self-defense forces could engage in combat 
against the forcefully recruited self-defense members. 
 Target Group for Mobilization: Finally, it has been found that when militias recruit from the 
same group as the insurgents they will be less likely to engage in violent acts, since this would mean 
that they are engaging against their own people (Stanton 2015). Thus, if the recruitment ground is 
similar for self-defense groups and DTOs, then the levels of violence should be lower. If this is the case 
however, it can become difficult to distinguish DTOs from genuine self-defense forces, which in turn 
might impact the enforcement efforts of the government, leading to higher levels of violence. This 
could lead to other DTOs or self-defense forces engaging in violence to gain control of the status quo.  
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Table 2 – Expected Impact of Self-Defense Groups on Violence 
Aspects of Militias Violence 
Perpetrated by  
Type of 
Violence  
Expected Impact 
on Level of 
Violence 
Expected Types of Violence  
Impacted  
Outsourced / 
Negligence  
Self-defense  Defensive Higher  Reprisal, Predominance, 
Enforcement and 
Competition 
 
Shift DTOs Reprisal  Higher  Enforcement, Competition, 
Defensive and 
Predominance 
 
Information Government  Enforcement Higher or Lower Retaliation, Reprisal, and 
Competition  
 
Recruitment 
Method 
Self-defense  Defensive  Higher  Enforcement, Reprisal, 
Competition, and 
Predominance 
 
Target Group for 
Mobilization  
Government Enforcement  Lower or Higher Competition, and 
Predominance 
 
Sources: Osorio  2013; Mitchell, Ca rey, and Butler 2014; Clayton and Thomson 2014;  Kalyvas 2006; Cohen and Nordȧs 
2015; and Stanton 2015.  
 
 The left column in table 2 identifies the aspects of militia engagement that might impact the 
levels and types of violence. Outsourcing the use of force, shifting the focus of violence by DTOs from 
the government to self-defense groups, information gathered by self-defense groups, recruitment 
methods, and the target group for mobilization, can all impact the levels and types of violence through 
different mechanisms. Derived from the outsourcing of force or the recruitment methods, self-defense 
forces can engage in defensive violence, which can lead to higher levels of violence and have an 
impact on all types of violence, except for retaliation. Information gathered by self -defense forces and 
the target group for mobilization of these groups can lead to the government engaging in enforcement 
violence, which can lead to higher or lower levels of violence, depending on the interaction between 
the government and militias, and the impact this interaction has on DTOs. In addition, enforcement 
efforts by the government can have an impact on almost all types of violence, with the exception of 
defensive violence, which should decrease as the government enforces the law. DTOs can lead to 
higher levels of violence in the region through reprisal. DTOs aim to maintain the monopoly on the use 
of force; if there is a challenge from self-defense forces, as opposed to the state, then criminal 
organizations are more likely to engage in acts of violence against self -defense groups. This violence 
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can impact all types of violence except for retaliation. Finally, violence perpetrated by DTOs, self -
defense groups, or the government can lead other DTOs to take advantage of the weakened capabilities 
of all the actors and engage in acts of competitive violence, leading to higher levels of violence.  
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4. Methodology 
 
 Through a case study, this thesis aims to uncover the effects that self-defense groups might have 
on the levels of drug-related violence. This is relevant because Mexico and many other countries 
(especially in Latin America) are facing increasingly strong threats from well -organized criminal 
organization, which can lead to the formation of self-defense militias. The findings can potentially help 
develop future strategies to address the evolution of self-defense groups, not only throughout Mexico, 
but wherever such groups might emerge.  
 Violence in Mexico wears many masks. Though other types of violence will be taken into 
account, in order to make this study more reliable, drug-related and intentional homicides will be the 
focus. Since self-defense forces are technically created for defensive purposes, using measures of drug-
related homicides that take place in the territory of such groups should capture instances of de fensive 
violence. Furthermore, drug-related homicides also capture instances of retaliation,  competitive, 
reprisal, and predominance violence. Because gathering reliable information on drug-related homicides 
is difficult, intentional homicides will help understand the overall impact of self-defense groups on 
levels and types of violence. Intentional homicide records are gathered by government offices, and 
capture enforcement and general levels of violence in a given region.  
Although the Mexican government has not published reliable numbers of drug-related 
homicides in the past few years, existing government data must be considered to understand the larger 
picture of violence occurring in Mexico. The official numbers published by the Mexican government 
differentiate between intentional homicides and unintentional homicides. Around 30 -50% of intentional 
homicides recorded by the Mexican authorities are drug-related (Heinle, Molzahn, and Shirk 2015a). In 
Mexico, there are two government bodies that collect and publish homicide data. The Instituto 
Nacional de Estadisticas y Geografia (INEGI) gathers the most comprehensive data, relying on public 
health records gathered by the many offices across the country. In comparison, the National Public 
Security System (SNSP) relies on data gathered by criminal investigations of law enforcement 
agencies. This thesis will use both INEGI and SNSP data to understand the overall variation in levels of 
violence across Mexico.  
Since the government does not publish reliable data concerning drug-related homicides, data 
gathered by non-official sources will also be employed. The national newspapers Reforma and Milenio 
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have made an effort to tally the numbers of drug-related homicides. Various other national and 
international organizations have also made an effort to gather all the available data on drug-related 
homicides to better analyze long-term trends (e.g. Justice in Mexico and Lantia). Thus, data on drug-
related violence in Michoacán and Guerrero will have to rely on secondary sources of information, 
which seem to be more conservative than government numbers (Shirk 2010).  
 In order to evaluate the impact that self-defense groups have on violence, the time span of the 
study will be limited from January 2013, when most groups were created in Michoacán and Guerrero, 
to December 2014, when the government intervened to disarm the militias in Michoacán. This study 
will also analyze the causal mechanism between violence and self -defense groups. This will be done 
firstly, through the analysis of primary sources, from government legislations concerning self-defense 
groups to legislations to combat crime derived from criminal organizations. Secondly, through the 
gathering of information from scholarly work concerning the history, goals, and types of self-defense 
groups that took up arms in the states of Michoacán and Guerrero. Finally, news articles will be used as 
a further source of information. The dependent variable will be homicides, while the independent 
variable will be active self-defense groups. 
 As noted, Mexico has experienced high levels of violence during the past decade or so. In line 
with Lieberman's (2005) nested analysis, the first section of the analysis will quantitatively evaluate the 
escalation in levels of violence across the 31 states of Mexico. The time frame will be limited to 2013-
2014, although the years 2011 and 2012 will be taken as a base to assess whether levels of violence 
have indeed increased or decreased in the observed time.  
 Next, a small-N comparative analysis will be employed. Self-defense groups are not an entirely 
new phenomenon in Mexico; however, since 2013 the number of militia -like groups has sharply risen 
across the nation (Fuentes Diaz 2014). Michoacán and Guerrero, have been selected as case studies to 
better understand the relationship between violence and militias outside of civil wars; these two states 
showcase some of the different types of self-defense groups that have emerged throughout Mexico. 
Even though self-defense groups in Guerrero and Michoacán are not identical, they were chosen, as 
according to Mill's (1843) first canon, the fact that both states have seen an increase in levels of drug-
related violence in 2014, points to self-defense groups being a likely probable cause for an increase in 
violence. Furthermore, as self-defense groups differ in Michoacán and Guerrero, process tracing 
(Bennet 2010; Collier 2011) will help discover whether the internal or external characteristics of the 
groups had something to do with a fluctuation in the levels and/or types of violence.    
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 The first part of the small-N comparative study will identify whether the levels of violence have 
increased or decreased since 2013 in the two states. According to the existing literature, and primary 
sources of information on homicides, it seems that violence (measured by number of drug-related 
homicides) has indeed increased in both Michoacán and Guerrero since 2013 (Heinle, Molzahn and 
Shirk 2015a).3 The presence of self-defense groups thus seems to be correlated with an increase in 
levels of violence in both states. However, it remains unclear if there is a causation between self -
defense groups and increased drug-related violence.  
 Next, the causal relationship between the self-defense groups and the levels and types of  
violence will be examined. Though, some might argue that it is not that self -defense groups have an 
effect on violence, but that violence leads to the appearance of self -defense groups, the purpose of this 
thesis is not to determine why and how self-defense groups developed, but to identify whether self-
defense groups have an impact on violence. The onset of self-defense forces might have a direct or 
indirect impact on levels and types of violence (see table 2). Hence, the analysis gather evidence from 
Michoacán and Guerrero, which supports either of the possible impacts self -defense groups have on 
levels and types of violence.  
Outsourced/Negligence: Measuring to what extent the government has intentionally outsourced 
the use of force is difficult. Actions taken by the government, especially the federal government, to deal 
with the rising number of self-defense groups can shed some light on the government’s intentions. 
While the government might not disclose information about their interaction with militias, especially if 
they are being used as a form of outsourced violence, the information that has been disclosed could 
give some insight on the motives behind government actions. The negligence of the government to 
react to the appearance of militias can be more easily verified. In this case, it would suffice if the 
government engaged with the self-defense forces (violently or peacefully) in order to maintain order in 
the area.  
 Shift: To measure a shift in violence from the government to self-defense groups, the number of 
deceased members of self-defense groups will be quantifiably verified. The source of the killing must 
be tested: whether it was perpetrated by a criminal organization, the state, or self -defense groups. 
Statements by group leaders to the media can help understand the underlying motivations behind acts 
                                                                 
3   However, the total number of intentional homicides has decreased in both Guerrero and Michoacán from 2013 
to 2014 and in Guerrero from 2012 to 2013, while Michoacán saw an increase in the level of intentional homicides from 
2012 to 2013 according to SPNP.  
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of violence committed by self-defense forces during the period in question.  
 Information to the state: Government attacks (or arrests) against criminal organization and 
government officials will be used to quantifiably measure if information is being provided to the state. 
As it is difficult to verify if attacks indeed resulted from information provided by self -defense groups, 
or other means, the quantity of successful attacks will be corroborated with official documents, and 
news articles.  
 Recruitment methods: Establishing recruitment methods from the various self-defense groups 
can be done through primary sources, as the appearances and development of such groups are 
discussed in detail.  
 Target group for mobilization: Michoacán and Guerrero are home to numerous ethnic groups. 
Self-defense groups might recruit along ethnic lines; if these ethnic groups are more or less attacked by 
the criminals, perhaps it can shed light on the implications recruitment from the same group has on 
violence. Information on ethnicity is readily available on a geographical basis. This information can be 
corroborated with the appearance of self-defense groups and homicides on a geographic basis. The 
target group for mobilization might make it hard for the government to distinguish between genuine 
self-defense groups and criminals disguised as militias. Primary sources of information will help 
understand who the members of self-defense groups are. 
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5. Case Study 
 
Understanding underlying dynamics that might have played a role in the increasing levels of 
violence in the states of Michoacán and Guerrero is essential to understand the impact self-defense 
groups have on violence. First an overview of the different types of militias present in Guerrero and 
Michoacán is necessary (for an overview of the DTOs involved in the conflicts in Michoacán and 
Guerrero see appendix 1). 
 
5.1. The Roots and Development of Vigilantism in Mexico  
 
 The wave of drug-related violence that has struck Mexico in recent times has changed the 
security situation in Mexico. The civilian population in Guerrero and Michoacán has been greatly 
affected by the predatory behavior of criminal organizations. Partially due to the fractionalization of 
DTOs, and partially due to the unwillingness or inability of the Mexican government to deal with 
predatory criminals, people have taken up arms to defend themselves and their territories from the 
extortion of criminal organizations. This has led to the development of militia-like groups across 
Mexico.  
 It is important to differentiate between the longstanding community police forces that have 
created a social and political system parallel to the state government in Guerrero, and the self-defense 
groups that have emerged since 2013 in both Guerrero and Michoacán. Differentiating between these 
groups and understanding their formation is essential, as the literature suggests, that the internal aspects 
of militias can impact levels of violence. While self-defense groups that have recently emerged in both 
states attempt to deal with external threats to their security, the longstanding community police forces 
in Guerrero aim at managing internal community matters (Estrada Castañon 2014).  
 Even if these two types of groups are different in many respects, they must be differentiated 
from paramilitary groups, such as the ones seen in Colombia. Both civil self -defense forces and 
paramilitary militias emerged from similar circumstances. However, Colombia’s military and  
government influenced the formation of the paramilitaries; in Mexico self -defense groups emerged as a 
civic response to the deteriorating security situation (Althaus and Dudley 2014). This differentiation is 
crucial since paramilitaries are a means for government or private recruiters to outsource violence 
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(Estrada Castañón 2014). Most self-defense forces in Mexico, at least at their formation, had no link to 
the state and their main goal was to expel corrupt officials and predatory criminal organizations from 
their territory (Ramirez Cuevas 2014). This does not mean that self-defense groups may not morph into 
something that resembles paramilitaries in the future. While some paramilitary groups, sponsored by 
private or criminal interests, have disguised themselves as self-defense forces in Mexico (Ramirez 
Cuevas 2014), the great majority of self-defense forces in Mexico today are clearly distinct from 
paramilitary groups.   
 Community-based vigilantism has a long tradition in (southern) Mexico. The right to this type 
of policing has been reserved for indigenous communities (Sierra 2006). The Mexican constitution 
defines indigenous people as the descendants of those who inhabited the national boundaries of Mexico 
before colonization, and that conserve their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions 
(Article 2 Paragraph 2). Supporters argue that the legal legitimacy for self -policing of indigenous 
communities has been enshrined in the Mexican constitution of 1917, which permits local frameworks 
for the regulation and solution of internal conflicts (Estrada Castañon 2014). Additionally, the 
constitution stipulates that state governments have the liberty to sign laws that are deemed necessary to 
maintain indigenous “customs and traditions” (usos y costumbres) (Article 2, Paragraphs 4 and 5). In 
2011 the government of Guerrero approved law 701, which in article 37 recognizes the right of the 
indigenous people to form community police forces (Matías Alonso 2014, 239). As a result, some 
indigenous communities across Guerrero have developed their own policing system, which not only 
involves active policing of the streets by local volunteers, but also trials and convictions of alleged 
criminals according to indigenous traditions (Sierra 2006). These community police forces are under 
the direct control of community elders and are not accountable to the state government (Estrada 
Castañon 2014). However, these community police did not emerge to challenge the state, rather to 
guarantee peace in their territory (Sierra 2014, 207).  
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5.1.1. Guerrero  
 
Guerrero is located south of Michoacán. Its nearly 3.5 million 
inhabitants continually rank among the poorest across Mexico (Kyle 
2015). Around 15% of the population in Guerrero is considered to be 
of indigenous descent (Romero Gallardo 2014). Much of the 
population is located in rural areas; more than 7,000 communities are 
populated by less than 2,500 inhabitants (INEGI 2010). While there 
are some middle class pockets in urban areas, the majority of urban settlements are characterized by 
lower class populations working in the informal sector of the economy (Kyle 2015).  
 
Figure 3: Guerrero State 
  Source: Kyle 2015 
 
 In Guerrero, indigenous community police units were first established in the early 1990s, when 
the local government was not able to protect the indigenous people from a wave of violence that struck 
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the state (Estrada Castañon 2014). However, it was not until 1997 that the former governor, Angel 
Aguirre Rivero, gave formal recognition to the community police forces (Estrada Castañon 2014). 
Following the recognition of autonomy by state authorities, the indigenous communities of Costa Chica 
and la Montaña formed the Coordinadora Regional de Autoridades Comunitarias y Policia 
Comunitaria (CRAC-PC), which coordinated the policing efforts of numerous communities (Romero 
Gallardo 2014). Additionally, the formation of the Sistema Comunitario de Seguridad, Imparticion de 
Justicia y Reeducacion (SCSIJR), allowed for the establishment of a legal system for self-protection 
(Sierra 2006). Through a slow process, the organization went from being a simple group of community 
police forces to a complex system of justice and security, outside the reach of the state. Their main role 
is to keep internal order, not only securing the streets, but also dealing with all types of unlawful action, 
from petty crime to drug-related incidents (Althaus and Dudley 2014, 9).     
    Due to the current wave of violence that has swept through Guerrero, an indigenous self-
defense group arose in 2012 around La Montaña (see figure 3). In contrast to the CRAC -PC, the group 
Coordinadora Regional de Seguridad y Justicia – Policia Ciudadana y Popular (CRSJ-PCP), was 
established as a direct response to the rising activities of DTOs in the region (Kyle 2015, 44). The 
CRSJ-PCP invoked the same rights as the CRAC -PC had received, due to their indigenous decent. In 
early 2013, a group of communities surrounding the mountainous region near Acapulco formed another 
group of community police forces, the Unión de Pueblos y Organizacion del Estado de Guerrero y 
Sistema de Seguridad y Justicia Ciudadana (UPOEG–SSJC). In contrast to CRAC -PC this militia was 
formed out of necessity to confront the rising numbers of extortions, kidnappings, and murders in the 
region (Global Post 2013). Although the members of the UPOEG-SSJC were mainly indigenous, in 
contrast to both CRAC-PC and CRSJ-PCP the UPOEG-SSJC did not make any claims under state law 
701. Today, all of these groups engage in confrontations against DTOs that extort the local population, 
but do not aim to eradicate the narcotics production in the area (Kyle 2015, 46).  
 In addition to these mainly indigenous self-defense groups, a number of non-indigenous militias 
have emerged in Guerrero. Although, the Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Guerrero (APPG) 
initially formed in 2006, it was not until 2012, amid illegal logging in the area, that it created a small 
policing unit (Kyle 2015, 47). At least another three self-defense groups appeared in Guerrero in 2014. 
The Movimiento Apaxtlense Adrián Costrejón (MAAC), in the municipality of Apaxtla is the best 
organized of these groups (Kyle 2015, 48). The MAAC, together with other unnamed groups that 
emerged in the town of Quetzala and villages neighboring Teloloapan, have focused on fighting La 
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Familia Michoacana (El Sur 2014). Other groups in the vicinity of San Miguel Totolopan have been 
fighting to keep out the Guerrero Unidos cartel (see figure 4) (Ramirez Garcia 2014).  
 
Figure 4: Self-Defense Networks in Guerrero (2014) 
         Source: Kyle 2015 
  
As a response to the rising number of militias in Guerrero, the state enacted a law that provided 
a pathway to incorporate self-defense groups into the police forces in 2013. However, the two largest 
and best organized indigenous forces, the CRAC -PC and the UPOEG-SSJC rejected the calls of the 
government. Other smaller, non-indigenous militias welcomed the legislation with caution. Only one 
group in the El Centro region has been reported to have agreed to join police efforts (Kyle 2015).   
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5.1.2. Michoacán   
Michoacán is located in the southwest of Mexico. It has a 
230-kilometer Pacific coastline, which houses one of the 
biggest deep-water ports of Mexico. It has a population of 
around 4.3 million, with around 3.5% of the population 
speaking one of the four main indigenous languages. 
Michoacán is a state rich in natural resources, and one of 
Mexico's largest agricultural producers (INEGI 2015). The 
people of Michoacán have historically been influential players when it comes to defying the status quo, 
from the independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century to the revolution in the twentieth 
century; citizens from Michoacán have been at the forefront in the fight for a homeland and civil 
liberties.  
Figure 5: Michoacán State 
 
Source: mapainteractivo.net 
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 While community police forces in Guerrero have a long history, in Michoacán, only one truly 
indigenous police force has recently emerged – Cherán. Due to the unwillingness or inability of local 
security forces to deal with illegal logging the community of Cherán, formed an indigenous  
community police to fight off criminals in 2011 (Ramirez Cuevas 2014, 59). Unlike Guerrero, 
Michoacán's government has not enacted any state legislation to legitimize indigenous police forces. 
Thus, the legality of the community police force in Cherán is solely founded on article 2 of the 
Mexican constitution.   
 By and large, the majority of self-defense groups that have emerged in Michoacán are of non-
indigenous decent. In 2013, various self-defense groups emerged across Michoacán's southern rural 
regions, the first of which took up arms in the town of Ruana, near Apatzingán. From the beginning 
these groups aimed at expelling DTO members and corrupt officials from their territory, establishing 
civil order in the region (Valdivia-Garcia 2014). As Jose Manuel Mireles Valverde, a former leader of a 
self-defense group stated: 
The vacuum of authority was filled by organized crime in the form of The Knights Templar, 
who became something that resembled an alternative government, extracting taxes, and 
imposing their justice, by blood or fire. While the people from Michoacán had nobody to 
rely on4 (CNN Mexico 2014c). 
 
 Similar self-defense forces soon emerged across the state. By the end of 2013, there were 
reports of some 20,000 self-defense group members, spread across southern Michoacán (Heinle, 
Molzahn, and Shirk 2015b, 18). Even though, the federal government implemented plans to regulate 
self-defense groups in January 2014, the number of militia groups in the Michoacán kept increasing. 
By May 2014, 34 municipalities reported active self-defense groups (see figure 6) (Valdivia-García 
2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
4  “El vacío de autoridad fue llenado por el crimen organizado, en la forma de Los Caballeros Templarios, quien es 
se volvieron algo así como un gobierno alterno, que cobraba impuestos, e imponía su justicia a sangre y fuego. Sin que la 
población michoacana tuviera a quién recurrir”  
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Figure 6:  Self-Defense Groups Presence in Michoacán (2014)  
  Source: Valdivia García 2014.  
  
Partially due to the rapid increase in self-defense groups, the types of recruits have been 
difficult to verify. Some reports suggest that former DTO members have managed to infiltrate the ranks 
of self-defense forces (Proceso 2014a). Others argue that cartels themselves are arming these groups. 
The Mexican government has accused self-defense groups, such as the one in La Ruana, Buenavista, of 
receiving support from DTOs fighting the Knights Templar (Excelsior 2013). However, the government 
has also acknowledged the valuable support from various other self-defense groups (Althaus and 
Dudley 2014, 14). 
The presence of self-defense groups in Michoacán has forced all levels of government to take 
the threat of DTOs seriously. While President Enrique Peña Nieto was initially reluctant to increase 
federal police and military presence in the state, the appearance of self -dense groups across the state in 
2013 caused the federal government to take action (Valdivia -García 2014). In mid-May Peña Nieto 
announced a new strategy to combat organized crime in Michoacán. This strategy centered around 
increased cooperation between federal and state forces (Valdivia -García 2014). The operation also 
included the deployment of army and navy forces across the various regions. These operations first 
began in the Tierra Caliente region, but later spread across Michoacán. In January 2014, the president 
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appointed Alfredo Castillo Cervantes as public security commissioner, in an effort to bring the state 
under control. Castillo Cervantes was given the authority to determine the state’s security strategy 
(Valdivia-García 2014). He was able to broker a deal with various self-defense forces that would see 
them either dismantle, or join the state policing apparatus through the newly formed rural defense corps 
operating under the authority of the Mexican army (Valdivia -García 2014). The agreement was signed 
by Castillo Cervantes, Governor Vallejo, and leaders of some self-defense forces (Heinle, Molzahn, and 
Shirk 2015b). The agreement specified that the self-defense groups are temporary, and it asked the 
leaders to register their members and weapons with the federal forces. However, not all groups were 
present at the signing of the document, suggesting that there might be some disagreement on the deal.  
 Whether or not self-defense groups cooperate with DTOs could have an important impact on 
the levels of violence, however this information is not available. Nevertheless, the fact that in July 2014 
the state government implemented a plan to integrate self-defense groups into the state security 
apparatus, suggests that at least the majority of these groups are not controlled by DTOs (Valdivia -
García 2014). Two different types of self-defense groups have emerged in Michoacán. On the one 
hand, there are those groups that have taken up arms and are stationed in the communities where they 
are supported by the local population, on the other there are some group, like the one from la Ruana, 
that have spread across the region, taking control of various towns (Heinle, Molzahn, and Shirk 
2015b). Whether self-defense groups act within their community or expand across the state might have 
different impacts on the types and levels of violence seen in that region.  
 While both the self-defense groups and the longstanding community police forces in Guerrero 
have emerged due to the inability of the government to guarantee the security of the population, and 
both types engage against DTO members, an important distinction lies in the legitima cy and structural 
development of the different groups. The community police forces in Guerrero rely on the indigenous 
people and laws that protect their rights to operate parallel to state law. The self-defense groups are 
mainly rooted in rural areas, and their leaders are not considered to be indigenous. In addition, 
community police forces in Guerrero have developed through a slow process, allowing the leaders to 
maintain strict control over who membership (Estrada Castañon 2014). In contrast, self-defense groups 
and their members have rapidly increased in numbers, making it harder for the leaders to control the 
quality of the recruits. This plays a role in how the state interacts with each group. While the 
government in Guerrero has largely allowed community police forces to enforce indigenous laws, some 
self-defense groups across both states have been accused of being just another DTO or having 
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connections to such groups (Rivera Velázquez 2014, 13). The government response to the rise of self -
defense groups has been cautious. While the state has cooperated with self-defense groups in some 
operations, most recently the government has implemented a policy to dismantle independent self -
defense groups. The strategy perused by Castillo in Michoacán has been to incorporate self-defense 
forces into the state security apparatus, as rural police forces with certain autonomy (Rivera Velázquez 
2014). Whether this has a positive or negative impact on the levels of violence remains to be seen.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
6. Violence Levels in Mexico 
President Peña Nieto came to office in 2012 with a promise to reduce levels of violence 
(Aristegui Noticias 2012). According to government data and the newspaper Milenio general levels of 
violence across Mexico, measured as intentional homicides and drug-related homicides, have indeed 
decreased since the president took office (see figure 7 and table 3). Yet, there has been an increasing 
number of self-defense groups emerging across the country. Through defensive, reprisal, or 
predominance violence self-defense groups might directly impact levels of violence in the territory 
where they operate. In addition, self-defense forces could have an indirect impact on enforcement, 
retaliation, and competitive violence, as they engage with DTOs and the government.   
 
Figure 7: Intentional Homicides in Mexico 
 
  Source: Heinle, Molzahn and Shirk 2015a 
 
Table 3: Drug-Related Homicides 
 2012 2013 2014 
Guerrero  1,408 961 1,075 
Michoacán  497 439 597 
Mexico 12,390 10,095 7,993 
  Source: Milenio 
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Most self-defense groups started to appear in early 2013 in Guerrero and Michacán (Valdivia -
Garcia 2014; Kyle 2015). In 2013 levels of intentional homicide decreased in Guerrero (from 2,310 
homicides in 2012 to 2,087 in 2013), but increased by 27% in Michoacán (from 755 homicides in 2012 
to 903 in 2013) (see figure 8). Levels of drug-related violence decreased in both states (see table 3 and 
figure 9). While the decrease in drug-related violence echoes the decrease in intentional homicides in 
Guerrero, the decrease of drug-related homicides in Michoacán does not reflect the increased 
intentional homicides. This discrepancy could be explained by the method of data gathering, as not all 
homicides can be considered to be drug-related, especially if they are committed by the government in 
order to enforce the law. This suggests, that while violence perpetrated by DTOs and self-defense 
forces might have led to a decrease in levels of drug-related violence in Michoacán in 2013, 
enforcement violence might have increased, as represented through intentional homicides. If the impact 
self-defense groups have on levels of violence is to be fully understood, levels of intentional homicides 
must be considered. This will shed light on the indirect implications self-defense groups have on levels 
of violence.  
Figure 8: Intentional Homicides by State – Comparing 2012 and 2013 
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Figure 9: Drug-Related Homicides by State: Comparing 2012 – 2013 
 
Source: Milenio; Heinle, Molzahn and Shirk 2015a 
 
In comparison to 2013, 2014 saw an increase in levels of drug-related violence, and a decrease 
in intentional homicides in both states (see table 3 and figures 10 and 11). The reduction in the levels of 
intentional homicides in 2014 could be related to the enforcement efforts by the government, 
suggesting that the efforts of the government to control self-defense groups and DTOs decreased in 
2014. This could have allowed self-defense forces or DTOs to engage in higher levels of violence, 
which were recorded as drug-related homicides.  
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Figure 10: Intentional Homicides by State: Comparing 2013 and 2014 
 
Figure 11: Drug-Related Homicides by State: Comparing 2013 – 2014 
 
Source: Milenio; Heinle, Molzahn and Shirk 2015a 
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7. Impact of Self-Defense Groups on Types and Levels of Violence 
7.1. Recruitment Method 
 
 Forcefully recruiting militia members can lead to higher levels of violence in a conflict (Cohen 
and Nordås 2015). In Mexico, however, there is no evidence of forceful recruitment. In fact, it seems 
that members of self-defense groups and community police forces in Michoacán and Guerrero started 
as volunteers. Grillo (2013) described the recruitment process in the small town of Tierra Colorada, 
Guerrero, in a TIME magazine article. People had suffered too much at the hands of cr iminal 
organizations, and given the inability of the government to uphold the rule of law, people decided to 
take action. The leader of the local self-defense group Esteban Ramos gathered the people of the town 
and said: “It is time to fight back. If you are in favor of our community police and want to join or 
support us, then step forward” (Grillo 2013, 1). At first nobody reacted, but soon a man stepped 
forward, followed by another nine men. The crowd cheered on. A new self -defense group had been 
formed (Grillo 2013). While not all self-defense groups formed in this way, Grillo's description of the 
formation of the militia reflects the overall development of self -defense groups in Mexico (Valdivia-
García 2014). This suggests that the recruitment methods of self-defense forces did not have an impact 
on the levels or types of violence in neither Michoacán nor Guerrero, as they were not forcefully 
recruited.  
  
7.2. Outsourced /Negligence 
 
 The deliberate outsourcing of violence to self-defense groups by the government, or the 
negligence of the state to control self-defense forces is expected to lead to higher levels of defensive 
violence. Furthermore, defensive violence could have a direct or indirect impact on reprisal, 
predominance, or competition violence. The onset of both self-defense forces, and community police 
took place as a civic response to the unwillingness or inability of the Mexican government to protect its 
civilian population from predatory criminal organization (Asfura -Heim and Espach 2013). This 
suggests that the Mexican government had nothing to do with the development of self -defense groups 
in Michoacán and Guerrero. When President Peña Nieto was asked about the legitimacy of self-defense 
groups he stated that the government, has made it clear that the Mexican state is the only responsible 
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body for maintaining security conditions for its citizens (CNN Mexico 2014b). He added that the 
Mexican government had no part in the expansion of such groups (CNN Mexico 2014b).  
 Even before the appearance of self-defense forces, the government was facing national and 
international criticism for the high levels of violence in the country; some even went as far as to argue 
that Mexico was a failed state (Sullivan 2011). The President's statements demonstrate how the 
government has been at odds with the recent development of self-defense forces. The government was 
permissive of self-defense forces, realizing the people's frustration over the security situation (INEGI 
2014). Yet the government did not want to lose its legitimacy, or be seen as a failed state by the 
international community, thus it took action to limit the scope of operation of self -defense forces across 
Michoacán and Guerrero. Hence, it seems unlikely that the government would use self -defense groups 
as a form of outsourced violence to evade accountability, as outsourcing violence to these groups 
brings the legitimacy of Mexico's government into question. Additionally, the fact that the Mexican 
government implemented policies to incorporate self-defense groups into the state apparatus in 
Guerrero and Michoacán, suggests that the government had little (if any) control over self-defense 
forces and their actions.  
 While it seems unlikely, given the available information, it is impossible to establish with all 
certainty whether the government deliberately used self-defense groups as a means to counter DTOs 
from areas under their control. At least until January 2014, state and federal government officials did 
not take actions to dismantle self-defense groups. President Peña Nieto implemented a plan in May 
2013 to deploy federal forces to Michoacán, but federal forces did not attempt to dismantle these 
groups. In fact, federal police forces were reported to escort self-defense groups in the state of 
Michoacán as early as April 10, 2013 (El Universal 2013). This suggests that at least in 2013, the 
government was unwilling to control the actions of militias, which in theory should lead to higher 
levels of defensive and thus drug-related violence. Yet, in 2013 the numbers of drug-related homicides 
decreased in both states.  
 Levels of intentional homicide increased in Michoacán in 2013. This suggests that either the 
gathering of drug-related homicide data was inaccurate in 2013, and thus violence actually increased 
with the appearance of self-defense groups, or that the increased intentional homicides reported by the 
government were perpetrated by state security forces. The answer probably lies somewhere in between. 
While self-defense forces engaged in sporadic confrontations against DTOs in 2013 the government 
also increased its presence in the state (El Pais 2014a). The demise of the strong Knights Templar in 
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Michoacán in 2013 probably included intentional homicides, in an effort to quell cartel support. This 
suggests that defensive violence together with enforcement efforts led to the increased levels of 
intentional homicides in Michoacán in 2013.  
 Contrary to the expected increase of levels of violence due to the negligence of the government 
to take actions against the development of militias (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014), the levels of  
drug-related violence and intentional homicides actually dropped in Guerrero in 2013. This points to 
the efficiency of self-defense groups in reducing the levels of violence in that state. Without much 
direct support from state forces, and with the element of surprise on their side, self -defense groups and 
more importantly community police forces, were able to push DTOs, its members, and corrupt officials 
out of the regions where self-defense groups operated. 
 However, as in Michoacán, levels of drug-related violence in Guerrero increased in 2014, while 
intentional homicides decreased in the same year. This could suggest that the government may have 
decreased its engagement, leaving self-defense forces and DTOs to fight each other, leading to lower 
numbers of intentional homicides, but higher levels of drug-related violence in Guerrero in 2014. 
However, the government actually increased its efforts to regulate militias in 2014. In Michoacán the 
government went as far as creating a police corps to integrate self-defense groups into the state security 
apparatus. Hence, militias were not able to freely engage in acts of defensive violence. The demise of 
the Knights Templars, a result of government and self-defense efforts, allowed foreign DTOs to 
challenge the status quo of the various regions of Michoacán, leading to higher levels of competitive 
drug-related violence in 2014. A similar situation occurred in Guerrero in 2014. While the police 
worked closely with some self-defense groups, the community police forces in the southern regions of 
the state managed to keep DTOs and the government out of their territory, leading to lower levels of 
violence in those regions. Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that it is competitive violence, not 
defensive violence, that led to an increase in levels of drug-related violence in both states in 2014.  
 As mentioned, there are at least two types of self-defense groups in Michoacán. Those that aim 
to protect their community from outside intrusion, and those that expand their sphere of influence 
across the region. The former, does not engage against other self-defense groups, unless they are being 
attacked, since by definition they are static. The latter has been found to engage in predominance 
violence. At least one confrontation between two self-defense groups in la Ruana has been registered. 
The confrontations between the group saw 11 self-defense members be killed (La Jornada 2014b). This 
confrontation between self-defense forces has been the exception rather than the rule. Thus, the 
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increase in levels of violence in 2014 in the state of Michoacán could not have been caused by 
predominance violence between self-defense forces. Evidence that self-defense groups or community 
police forces engaged in violent actions against each other in Guerrero is also lacking.  
 While there in no evidence suggesting that the government outsourced violence, it is clear that 
the negligence of the government had an indirect impact on the escalation in levels of violence in 
Guerrero and Michoacán. While sporadic confrontations between self-defense groups did take place in 
both states, the number and intensity of these confrontations cannot fully explain the escalation of 
violence levels from 2013-2014. In addition, defensive actions taken by self-defense groups, and 
community police forces seem to have culminated in the apprehension of criminals (Althaus and 
Dudley 2014). Thus, self-defense forces have had an indirect impact on violence. The appearance of 
self-defense groups forced the government, to take a proactive approach to combat predatory criminal 
organizations. In addition, in 2014 competitive violence between DTOs dramatically increased in 
Michoacán, largely due to actions taken by self-defense groups to take down the Knights Templar. In 
Guerrero, however, self-defense groups do not seem to have had such an effect on DTOs, since 
confrontations between criminal groups have been common since 2009.  
 
7.3. Target Group for Mobilization 
 
 The target group for mobilization of self-defense forces is expected to lead to higher or lower 
levels of violence (Stanton 2015); it can also have an impact on competition and predominance 
violence. As mentioned, the rapid expansion of self-defense forces, especially in Michoacán, makes it 
difficult even for militia leaders to verify the background of their recruits. Additionally, while various 
ethnic groups exist across Mexico, indigenous communities comprise a minority in Michoacán and 
Guerrero (Serrano Carreto 2006). Around 15% of the population of Guerrero is of indigenous decent, 
while only 3.5% of the citizens of Michoacán are indigenous (Serrano Carreto 2006). The great 
majority of indigenous people are located in the southern region of Guerrero, while in Michoacán 
indigenous communities are found in the central highlands (Serrano Carreto 2006). In the community 
of Cherán in Michoacán, and in the Costa Chica and La Montaña region of Guerrero, community 
police forces recruited volunteers along ethnic lines. In Guerrero areas with a high concentration of 
indigenous people (Costa Chica and La Montaña) experienced lower levels of violence than the rest of 
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the state (Kyle 2015). However, DTOs in general are not known to have recruited along ethnic lines. 
This leads to the conclusion that while levels of violence are lower in indigenous regions of Guerrero, 
it is not because the recruitment ground of community police forces and DTOs is the same in the state. 
Rather, the relatively lower levels of violence in Costa Chica and La Montaña can be best explained by 
the organizational structure of community police forces; having developed a complex system that 
includes trials and convictions of criminals outside the state apparatus, the co mmunity police forces in 
Guerrero have been able to keep DTOs out of their territory in Guerrero.  
 Although, the community police force in Cherán, Michoacán does not enjoy the same rights as 
similar groups in Guerrero, at least in 2013 there were no homic ides reported in the municipality 
(INEGI 2015). This trend demonstrates that even without the complex system that has been developed 
in Guerrero, indigenous community police forces are able to seal their territory from the intrusion of 
foreign DTOs. Just as in Guerrero, the recruitment ground of DTOs and community police forces in the 
municipality of Cherán are not a likely causes for the lower levels of violence seen in those regions.  
Rather, in Cherán, it seems that the ability of the indigenous people to work together against the threat 
of DTOs has allowed the community police in the area to keep violence out.  
 If the recruitment ground plays a role in increased levels of violence, then only because it has 
become increasingly difficult for the government to distinguish between self-defense forces and 
criminals disguised as such. The government found itself involved in a number of altercations against 
self-defense forces. In January 2014, after the federal government announced plans to regulate militias 
in Michoacán, confrontations between the military and self-defense groups left only two dead in the 
Tierra Caliente region (La Jornada 2014a). It was not until January 2015 that further confrontations 
between federal security forces and alleged self-defense groups took place in Apatzingan killing 11 and 
seeing 44 people arrested (Proceso 2015). The government insists it was not fighting a self-defense 
group (although this is disputed), but a criminal organization linked to the Viagras cartel (Proceso 
2015). This confrontation demonstrates how difficult distinguishing between criminal self-defense 
groups and legitimate ones has become. Nonetheless, Mexico has been reluctant to take concrete 
actions against self-defense forces. The plans by the government to integrate Michoacán and Guerrero's 
self-defense forces into the state security apparatus, demonstrates a willingness to cooperate with such 
groups. 
  It has become increasingly difficult for the government to distinguish self-defense groups, as 
these are often recruited from the same grounds as criminal organizations. However, despite the 
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overlap of recruitment grounds, this has not impacted violence levels. Enforcement efforts to counter 
self-defense groups have been limited, suggesting that the government has decided to take a cautious 
approach towards self-defense forces, even if they are suspected of being criminal groups. This is 
perhaps because the government's approval rating in Michoacán and Guerrero is extremely low, as 
exemplified by both governors renouncing their post in late 2014 (El Universal 2014). The government 
did attempt to enforce the rule of law in 2014, not by fighting self -defense forces, but rather by 
attempting to regulate them, leading to some arrests of alleged criminal self -defense members (El 
Universal 2014). This suggests that due to the difficulty in distinguishing the two types of groups, the 
government has decided not to engage in frequent violent confrontations; this has led to lower levels of 
enforcement violence directed at self-defense members. Indigenous areas have seen lower levels of 
violence in general, due their exclusive recruitment grounds, which has allowed them to avoid 
becoming entangled with DTOs and government forces fighting DTOs. 
 
7.4. Information to the State 
 
 Militias can serve as a reliable source of information for the government. While community 
police forces work parallel to the government, self-defense groups have been known to work in tandem 
with the state. Theoretically, given the local knowledge of self -defense groups, cooperation with the 
government can lead to the sharing of high quality intelligence, which can help the government move 
from indiscriminate violence to selective violence against DTOs (Kalyvas 2006). However, whether the 
sharing of information leads to higher or lower levels of violence depend on how the government uses 
the information. If the government decides to target DTO members, then this can lead to higher levels 
of enforcement violence. However, if the government decides to only target the leadership of criminal 
organizations then it might lead to lower levels of enforcement violence. Either way the enforcement of 
the law can lead to competition or retaliation violence against state security forces or reprisal against 
self-defense groups if they are found to be providing information to the government.  
 In Michoacán the federal intervention led to cooperation between self -defense groups and the 
state security apparatus (Althaus and Dudley 2014). In comparison, the federal government did not 
respond to continuing violence (and thereby also to self-defense groups) in Guerrero until the 26 of 
September 2014, when 43 students in the municipality of Iguala disappeared, shocking the nation (El 
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Pais 2014b). Prior to the incident in Iguala, the state government had made some efforts to regulate 
self-defense groups by integrating them into the state police. However, the level of cooperation 
between state forces and self-defense groups has not reached the level seen in Michoacán, where self -
defense forces were often seen working closely with federal security forces (Althaus and Dudley 2014).  
 Government has been enforcing the law on three different levels: federal, state, and municipal. 
While the federal government has better trained, paid, and equipped police officer and the support from 
the military, the municipal government has limited police forces, funds, and training. The state police 
capacities are somewhere in between (Rivera Velázquez 2014). This discrepancy of professionalism at 
the different levels of police has been acknowledged by top officials, there are plans to improve and 
unify the structure of police force across Mexico (Schedler 2013). Nevertheless, this discrepancy has 
slowed down counter-criminal efforts ever since former president Calderon decided to implement a 
policy to eradicate DTOs from Mexico (Schedler 2013).  
 As the development of self-defense groups exemplifies, the civilian population in Mexico lacks 
trust in government officials, especially at the municipal level. Across Mexico at least 90% of crimes 
go unreported (INEGI 2014). Statistics say that in 2014 around 94% of crime went unreported in 
Michoacán and in Guerrero 96.7% (INEGI 2014). Yet, if the government wants to fight crime it needs 
to restore the people's trust, which can also lead to need access to high quality information. Self-
defense groups might be the link between the government and the people that is needed to better target 
criminals in Mexico. However, in order for the information gathered through cooperation with self-
defense groups to be efficient, cooperation between the different levels of government must also 
improve.  
 The attitude towards cooperation in Michoacán improved dramatically with the election of 
Governor Fausto Vallejo in 2012. While at first Peña Nieto was reluctant to increase federal police and 
military presence in the state, once self-defense groups started to appear across the state in early 2013, 
the federal government decided to take swift action (Valdivia -García 2014). In mid-May the president 
announced a new strategy to combat organized crime in the state. In January 2014, appointed by the 
federal government, Castillo set out a plan to regulate militias in Michoacan.  
 The levels of cooperation between militias and the federal government have fluctuated since 
2013. At the beginning, the government seemed willing to fight alongside the expanding self-defense 
forces. State security forces and self-defense members were reported to enter towns in tandem (Althaus 
and Dudley 2014). Self-defense groups operated check points across the state handed over alleged 
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criminals to federal police forces. This cooperation led to the sharing of high-quality intelligence, 
leading to the arrest and killing of various Knights Templar members (Althaus and Dudley 2014). The 
arrest of one of the founders of the Knights Templars, Nazario Moreno, in March 2013, demonstrates 
that this cooperation led to high profile arrests of DTO members. In early April of the same year, 
Michoacán’s interior minister, Jesus Reyna was arrested for having alleged ties to the Knights Templar 
(Proceso 2014b). Through this early cooperation, the government was able to target law enforcement 
efforts accurately, leading to the arrest of hundreds of DTO members and supporters. Confrontation 
between DTOs and state forces led to the death of at least 22 people by July 2013, two of which were 
part of the state security forces, while the remaining 20 were said to be criminals (BBC 2013). By the 
end of 2013, a total of 39 members of federal forces were said to have deceased in the state of 
Michoacán alone (Animal Politico 2013).  
 This cooperation might explain that while drug-related violence decreased in 2013, intentional 
homicides increased in the same year in Michoacán. As the government was able to target criminals, 
the number of enforcement efforts increased, leading to an increase in levels of intentional homicide in 
2013. In turn, partially due to the enforcement efforts, the Knights Templar were not able to engage in 
too many violent acts, leading to a temporary decrease in levels of drug-related violence. 
 Over time, self-defense forces became problematic for the government, challenging the state on 
the monopoly of the use of force, just as the cartels had done in the past. With the arrival of Castillo to 
Michoacán in 2014, cooperation between self-defense forces and the government started to decrease.  
Those groups that agreed to form part of the rural police corps reported that they were not able to curve 
violence to the desired extent (Animal Politico 2015a), pointing to a reduction in the enforcement 
efforts of the government in 2014.  
 The financial and operative capabilities of the Knights Templar in Michoacán were diminished 
by 2014 (Animal Politico 2015a). Yet, this has not led to a lasting decrease in the level of drug-related 
violence. On the contrary, the actions taken by the government to contain the expansion of self-defense 
forces and to challenge the status quo of the regions where the Knights Templar had control, directly 
contributed to the rise of intentional homicides across the state in 2013, and indirectly to the rise of 
drug-related violence in 2014. In 2014, there was a decrease in government casualties, but an increase 
in deaths of self-defense members as a result of confrontations (Animal Politico 2015a). The reduction 
in the number of deceased security forces, and the increasing death-toll of self-defense group members 
in 2014, suggest that the government stepped back its enforcement efforts in Michoacán in 2014. This 
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perhaps led to a decrease in the levels of intentional homicides, and an increase in levels of drug-
related homicides in 2014, as other cartels and self-defense groups fought for control over the lucrative 
trading routs in Michoacán.   
Inaction by the government has contributed to the increasing levels of violence in Guerrero; 
rather than enforce the law, the government stood aside, allowing various groups in the region to fight 
each other (Seguridad Paz y Justicia 2014). In part government negligence can be attributed to 
corruption of officials who took bribes to turn their heads when DTOs were conducting illegal 
activities (Kyle 2015, 38). According to Raúl Núñez Salgado, former financial operator of the 
Guerreros Unidos cartel, his organization would make payments of up to 600,000 Mexican pesos per 
month (about US$40,000), to the local police forces in Iguala, allowing the DTO to operate freely in 
the area (Proceso 2014c).  
 While some police officers deliberately engage in illegal activities with DTOs, by far the 
preferred strategy for the survival of state security forces is avoidance (Kyle 2015). This has been the 
case not only at the municipal level, but also state and federal level (Kyle 2015, 39). The number of 
casualties suffered by security forces has dramatically decreased since 2012 (see figure 12). However, 
the reduction in casualties is not due to a reduction in the levels of violence, since levels of drug-related 
violence increased from 2013-2014. The decrease in the number of casualties can be best explained by 
the lack of confrontations between DTOs and state security forces. Hence, Guerrero saw a decrease in 
intentional homicides, while Michoacán saw intentional homicides increase in 2013 due to the presence 
of federal forces.  
 Partially due to the reduction of confrontations between DTOs around Acapulco, Guerrero, 
drug-related homicides also decreased in 2013 (Kyle 2015, 23). It was not until after escalating protests 
across the state due to the disappearance of the 43 students in Igua la that former governor Aguirre 
Rivero stepped down in October 2014 (Milenio 2015). Following the resignation of the governor, the 
Federal government took over security efforts of the state, leading to an increased presence of federal 
police forces across Guerrero.  
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Figure 12: Police and Military Casualties in Guerrero, 2007-2014
 
       Source: Kyle 2015 
  
It is too early to tell whether the deployment of federal forces to Guerrero will have an impact 
on the levels intentional homicides. The community forces are not known to engage in extensive 
cooperation with state security forces, hence, they have not shared tactical information. As for the 
somewhat dispersed self-defense groups, cooperation with the government has been limited as well. In 
fact, self-defense leaders have downplayed the presence of federal police forces, stating that their 
presence is only temporary (El Sur 2013). Thus, the steady decrease in levels of intentional homicides 
does not seem to be correlated with the provision of information from militias to the government in 
Guerrero. Instead, it seems plausible that the lack of engagement of the security forces can explain the 
decreasing levels of intentional homicides.  
 Drug-related violence slightly increased from 2013 to 2014. However, this increase does not 
seem to be due to enforcement efforts, rather it seems that the capture the leader of the Beltran Leyva  
cartel in October 2014 has created yet another power vacuum in the state, which several DTOs in the 
region are attempting to fill (Kyle 2015).  
 In contrast to the reaction and the consequent cooperation that emerged between the federal 
government and self-defense forces in Michoacán, in Guerrero, cooperation between community police 
forces and self-defense forces, and the government has been limited. The cooperation in Michoacán led 
to the arrest of many Knights Templar members, and their leadership in 2013. However, once the 
Knights Templar had been weakened, the government moved to regulate the self -defense groups. 
Together, these actions have opened up an opportunity for other DTOs to battle over control of the 
lucrative trading routes of the state. In Guerrero, it was not the sharing of information that led to the 
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intervention by federal forces; rather, it was the shocking events that took place in Iguala, which 
demonstrated the levels of influence DTOs had reached in the state. Thus, in Guerrero the sharing of 
information between the government and militias had little to do with the escalations of violence, it is 
more likely that the avoidance by state security forces have allowed for further confrontations between 
DTOs in Guerrero.  
  
7.5.  Shifting DTOs' Focus from Government to Self-Defense Groups 
 
 The rise of self-defense groups has had an impact on the operations of DTOs in Michoacán and 
Guerrero. Self-defense groups engaging against DTOs can lead to reprisal violence, which in turn can 
lead to higher levels of drug-related violence. In addition, reprisal violence can give place to defensive 
and predominance violence, if self-defense groups are attacked or if self-defense groups become 
criminals themselves. Reprisal violence can force the government to become more engaged in the 
conflict, leading to higher levels of enforcement violence. Finally, if DTOs shift their focus from the 
government to self-defense groups, it might weakened their capabilities, opening up an opportunity for 
other criminal organizations to compete for territory, leading to higher levels of drug-related violence.  
 As the main aim of self-defense forces in Michoacán is stop the predation of the Knights 
Templar, self-defense groups in Michoacán have taken a more confrontational approach against DTOs, 
than similar groups in Guerrero have. Enforcement actions, together with the defensive actions taken 
by self-defense groups in Michoacán to challenge the status quo of the areas controlled by the Knights 
Templar have forced the cartel to engage in violent actions against self -defense forces. In comparison, 
self-defense forces and the government in the state of Guerrero have not been as efficient in 
challenging the many DTOs. Hence, confrontations between DTOs and self -defense forces in Guerrero 
have been limited. 
  In 2013, the rapid development of self-defense forces across southern Michoacán saw a few 
sporadic confrontations between self-defense groups and the Knights Templar. By the end of October 
2013, 23 members of self-defense forces had perished while fighting the Knights Templar (Aristegui 
Noticias 2013). However, government officials put the death toll at only five (Aristegui Noticias 2013). 
Confrontations between the Knights Templar and self-defense forces reached a peak in January 2014, 
when on at least five different occasions altercations between various self -defense groups and the 
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Knights Templar were reported (El Diario 2014). However, as Michoacán saw a decrease in the level of 
drug-related homicides in 2013, the confrontations between DTOs and self-defense groups do not seem 
to have culminated in too many homicides that year. It seems that enforcement efforts conducted by the 
government helped diminish the capabilities of the Knights Templar before they could retaliate against 
self-defense forces.  
 Even though only a handful of confrontations took place between self-defense forces and 
Knights Templars, the fall of the DTO can be partially attributed to the rise of self -defense forces. This 
is primarily due to the cooperation of self-defense groups and federal police, which led to the arrest of 
hundreds of Knights Templar (Althaus and Dudley 2014, 14). While the lines between criminal 
organizations and the offensive self-defense groups has recently become somewhat blurry, the demise 
of the Knights Templar in Michoacán has created a power vacuum that is being filled by other DTOs. 
At least five DTOs are currently fighting for the control of the trading routes in Michoacán (see figure 
13) (Animal Politico 2015b). At least one of them, La Tercera Hermandad, is alleged to have formed 
through cooperation between self-defense groups and some members of various DTOs (Excelsior 
2014). Mireles, a former leader of a self-defense group in Michoacán, has warned of a possible 
“Colombianization” of the self-defense groups (Excelsior 2014). He argues that there have been too 
many former DTO members that have been allowed to join self-defense groups, at times even rising to 
the rank of leadership (Excelsior 2014). Thus, the power vacuum in Michoacán left by the Knights 
Templar has not only been filled by DTOs, but also by criminal self-defense groups, which have taken 
advantage of the situation, and have morphed into something that resembles a paramilitary group. 
Competition between DTOs and the rise of paramilitary groups can be considered as a main factor for 
the increased levels of drug-related violence in Michoacán in 2014.  
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Figure 13: Number of Criminal Organizations operating in the state of Michoacán (2015) 
 
 Source: Animal Politico 2015b 
  
In Guerrero, community police forces can “properly claim that they have succeeded in 
significantly reducing DTO extortion activities in the areas they control” (Kyle 2015, 46).  Similarly, 
self-defense groups have been relatively efficient at reducing the number of casualties in the areas 
where they operate. According to the Guerrero Violence Project, the number of deaths in the area where 
self-defense groups operate was 21 in 2013 and 10 in 2014, with only one self-defense member 
deceased (Kyle 2015). However, there are many DTOs operating within Guerrero, which could mean 
that DTOs cannot afford to refocus their efforts to confront self-defense forces, since preventing other 
DTOs from gaining territory is more important.  
 The long tradition of community police forces in the southern mountainous regions of Guerrero, 
has demonstrated that well organized community police forces, working parallel to the government, 
can help reduce the levels of violence (Kyle 2015, 46). By the end of 2014, 62 out of 81 municipalities 
in the state reported the presence of criminal organizations (Excelsior 2014). The 19 municipalities 
where no DTOs were recorded are all areas where community police forces are present (Milenio 2014). 
The remaining self-defense groups dispersed around the state have developed as a result of the 
fragmentation of DTOs and the competitive violence that has come with it (Kyle 2015). There is no 
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evidence pointing to confrontation between self-defense forces and DTOs, as a direct factor for the 
increasing levels of drug-related violence in Guerrero in 2014. Nor is there any evidence suggesting 
that government enforcement actions had a dramatic impact on the levels of drug-related violence in 
the state. The increasing drug-related violence in 2014 can best be attributed to the fractionalization of 
DTOs in the state and the resulting competitive violence (Kyle 2015). 
 While some fighting between self-defense forces and the Knights Templar took place in 2013 
and 2014, the number of deceased due to the confrontations does not point to the shifting of focus of 
DTOs from the government to self-defense groups as being the primary cause of increased violence in 
Michoacán. However, the sporadic fighting impacted the willingness of the federal government to 
intervene in 2013 leading to higher levels of intentional homicides. The depleted capabilities of the 
Knights Templar triggered other DTOs to challenge territorial control. In contrast, Guerrero had seen 
an escalation in the number of confrontations between DTOs before the formation of self-defense 
groups. While self-defense forces seem to have been relatively efficient at maintaining peace in the 
areas they control, the ongoing infighting between cartels in other territories may be distracting DTOs 
from fighting self-defense forces. In other words, it appears that criminal organizations have to allocate 
their resources to fight other DTOs rather than to refocus their energy on self -defense forces in 
Guerrero. For its part, community police forces in southern Guerrero have been relatively efficient in 
keeping DTO influence outside their territory.      
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8. Concluding Remarks 
 
 Recent levels of violence in Mexico have reached levels comparable to intrastate wars. Yet, it 
would be wrong to define Mexico's situation as a civil war. While the government is partially to blame 
for the rapid escalation of violence, DTOs have carried out most of the homicides seen in Mexico in the 
past decade. However, contrary to most rebels in civil wars, criminal organizations in Mexico are 
motivated by economic incentives. While maintaining control of some territory has allowed DTOs in 
Michoacán and Guerrero to freely engage in illicit activities, today criminal networks do not attempt to 
challenge the political order, which has allowed them to illegally extract economic resources. While 
this approach has worked in the past, the increasing of state security forces to enforce the rule of law, 
have diminished the earnings of many cartels, leading to the predation of the local population to extract 
the foregone economic resources. Due to the inability or unwillingness of the government to protect its 
civilian population, the people of Michoacán and Guerrero have taken up arms in order to defend 
themselves. This has led to the creation of various forms of militias. The indigenous based community 
police forces in Guerrero (and partially in Michoacán), have developed a comprehensive governance 
system, independent from the government. In comparison non-indigenous groups across Michoacán 
and Guerrero have created self-defense groups, with the sole aim of protecting their communities by 
diminishing the influence of cartels in their territory.  
 Yet, most of the literature that attempts to explain the escalation in levels of violence in Mexico 
throughout the past decade or so has largely neglected the impact militias have on levels and types of 
violence. This thesis has relied on the limited literature on militia violence during civil wars, to better 
understand the impact militias have on levels and types of violence outside intrastate conflicts. Scholars 
of civil wars have identified different mechanisms through which militias impact levels and types of 
violence during conflicts. While these findings must be taken with caution, as Mexico is not in a state 
of civil war, the similarities between civil wars and the current conflict in Mexico make it possible to 
derive possible mechanisms through which militias can effect levels and types of violence in Mexico 
(see table 4).  
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Table 4 –  Impact of Self-Defense Groups on Violence 
Aspects of Militias Violence 
Perpetrated by  
Type of 
Violence  
Impact on Level 
of Violence 
Types of Violence  Impacted  
Recruitment 
Method 
Self-defense  Defensive  No Impact None   
Outsourced / 
Negligence  
Self-defense  Defensive Higher  Enforcement and 
Competition 
 
Target Group for 
Mobilization  
Government Enforcement  No Impact Enforcement (Lower)  
Information Government  Enforcement Higher  Retaliation, Defensive, and 
Competition  
 
Shift DTOs Reprisal  No Impact Enforcement (Higher),  and 
Competition (Higher) 
 
Sources:  Osorio 2013; Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014; Clayton and  Thomson 2014;  Kalyvas 2006; Cohen and Nordȧs 
2015; and Stanton 2015.  
 
 Militias had different impacts on the levels and types of violence in Michoacán and Guerrero. 
While sporadic confrontations between self-defense forces and the Knights Templar took place in 
Michoacán, defensive and reprisal violence alone cannot explain the increased levels of intentional 
homicides in 2013. Rather, the rapid development of self-defense groups in 2013 forced state security 
forces to combat the hegemonic Knights Templar in the state. Aided with high quality information 
gathered by self-defense groups in 2013, state security forces were able to confront the Knights 
Templar, leading to higher levels of intentional homicides in 2013. The actions taken by the 
government to dismantle the criminal networks present in the state temporarily decrease the levels of 
drug-related violence in 2013. In 2014 the government continued to apprehend leaders of the Knights 
Templar, but in general reduced its enforcement efforts, and started to regulate self-defense groups, 
leading to fewer confrontations against DTOs and thus a reduction in intentional homicides. By 2014 
the capabilities of the Knights Templar had been diminished, which allowed other DTOs to fight for 
control over Michoacán, with the result being an increase in drug-related violence in 2014. Thus, in 
Michoacán self-defense groups had an indirect impact on the levels of violence, as their presence 
increased enforcement and competitive violence.  
 Guerrero had seen exceptionally high levels of violence since 2009 when various DTOs started 
to fight each other for territorial control. However, by 2013, the partial consolidation of various 
criminal groups around the Acapulco area led to a temporary reduction in levels of drug-related 
homicides. Levels of drug-related violence remained relatively low until October 2014, when the head 
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of the strongest cartel in Guerrero, the Beltran Leyva cartel, was capture by state security forces. This 
caused competition between DTOs in the state to escalate. Thus, self-defense groups had little to do 
with the fluctuation in levels of drug-related violence in Guerrero.  
 The appearance of self-defense groups in 2013 coincided with decreasing intentional 
homicides. The lower levels of intentional homicides in 2013 and 2014 seen in Guerrero, can partially 
be attributed to the efficiency of self-defense groups and community police forces to secure their 
territory from criminal organizations, without the need to engage in extensive violent confrontations. In 
contrast to the quick response by the federal government in Michoacán, which led to higher levels of 
intentional homicides, Guerrero did not see increasing enforcement efforts after the appearance of 
militias. This was perhaps so because Guerrero has had a long history of militia like groups (indigenous 
police forces) operating outside the control of the state. However, the lack of enforcement actions 
contributed to the reduction in levels of intentional violence. While, the reduction of intentional 
violence is a positive development, the lack of enforcement action is worrying. It seems that areas 
under the control of self-defense groups and community police forces are safer than other areas. This 
suggests that the civilian population may be better prepared than the government to make the necessary 
changes in order to restore peace and stability.  
Even if the escalation in levels of drug-related violence cannot be directly attributed to self-
defense forces in Michoacán or Guerrero, self-defense groups indirectly impact violence by effecting 
the types of violence found. Their presence can cause more enforcement violence; self -defense groups 
played a crucial role in urging the government to take swift action. The defensive violence by self -
defense groups has partially interrupted the illicit activities of DTOs in the areas under the control of 
self-defense groups. This increase in enforcement violence and defensive actions by the militias has 
also led to an increase in competitive violence. The actions taken by the government in Michoacán, 
first to increase federal security forces in 2013, and then to integrate self -defense groups into the state 
security apparatus in 2014, have demonstrated that cooperation between civilians and the government 
can lead to diminishing the capabilities of DTOs. This then has created power vacuums that are filled 
via competitive violence perpetrated by other DTOs.  
As long as the opportunity to profit from illegal activities is present, diminishing the 
capabilities of one cartel will invite an unknown number of challenging criminal organizations to 
perpetrate acts of violence. Therefore, while it can be helpful for the government to work in 
cooperation with militias, a lasting peace can only be achieved if DTOs stop competing for the control 
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of lucrative illicit businesses.  
People are fed up with the lack of political will to change the status quo that has allowed 
criminal organizations to profit. The appearance of self-defense groups across Mexico can be seen a 
desperate effort by the civilian population to force the government to take responsibility for the security 
situation in the country. While militias have been willing to cooperate with the government in recent 
years, if the security situation does not improve, self-defense groups could turn violent and become 
something that resembles a paramilitary group, perhaps even challenging the authority of the state. 
While the federal government has started to implement a number of reforms to strengthen state and 
municipal police, the Mexican government has to do more to stop younger generations from joining 
criminal organizations. Beyond social development, only when economic benefits of joining a criminal 
organization are outweighed by credible consequences, will the number of future DTO recruits 
decrease. However, in order for this to happen the government must tackle the endemic impunity 
enjoyed by criminals all over the country. To do this, the government needs not only to implement far 
reaching reforms of the judiciary, but it must also fight against corruption. Self-defense groups do not 
challenge the legitimacy of the Mexican government today, however, the government must take notice 
of the unconformity of its people with the current security situation. If the situation does not change, 
then the Mexican government could face further challenges not only from criminal organizations, but 
also from the very people it represents.  
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Appendix 1: The Criminal History of Michoacán and Guerrero  
 
Criminal Groups in Michoacán 
 
 Partially due to its strategic geographic position, Michoacán has seen the development of 
criminal organizations across the entirety of the state. The origins of DTOs in the state go back to the 
1970s, when José Valencia, owner of an avocado plantation started to cultivate cannabis and opium 
poppy (Heinle, Molzahn, and Shirk 2015b). By the 1990s, the criminal group had flourished under the 
leadership of Armando Cornelio Valencia, and it became known as the Milenio Cartel. Partially due to 
the cover that avocado exports gave to the Milenio Cartel, and partially due to the ties the cartel held 
with the larger Juarez Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel5, the cartel was able to freely operate without much 
interruption until the turn of the century (Althaus and Dudley 2014)6.  
 This relative peace was interrupted when an associate of the Milenio Cartel named Carlos “El 
Tísico” (Tuberculosis) Rosales Mendoza splintered from the group, forming a new organization called 
La Empresa (the Company). Rosales Mendoza's close ties to Gulf Cartel7 leader Cárdenas, allowed the 
newly formed cartel to challenge the existing status quo of the state with the support of the paramilitary 
arm of the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas8. When in 2003 Valencia was captured by the authorities, it seemed 
that Rosales would gain ground across Michoacán. However, Rosales was captured in 2004, leading to 
the splinter of La Empresa from the Zetas by two of Rosales associates – Nazario “El Chayo” Moreno 
Gonzáles and José de Jesús “El Chango” Méndez Vargas, which created La Familia Michoacana (The 
Michoacan Family). This newly formed cartel employed a semi-religious standing and vowed to 
protect the local population from outside intrusion, a strategy that had not been seen before anywhere 
in the country (Althaus and Dudley 2014). However, once competing DTOs were expelled from the 
state, La Familia Michoacana started to extort and kidnap the local population for economic benefits.  
                                                                 
5 At the time, there w ere four drug cartels that controlled most of the drug trade in Mexico: they w ere the Gulf Cartel (Cartel del 
Golfo), the Juarez Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel (and their smaller partner the Beltran Leyva Organization), and the Tijuana Car tel (also know n 
as the Arellano Felix Organization). 
6   The junior partner of the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltran Leyva Organization, controlled the coastal area surrounding the Lazaro 
Cardenas port, w hile the Milenio cartel controlled the agricultural region of Tierra Caliente in Michoacán’s mountainous region.  
7   “The Gulf Cartel is one of the oldest and most pow erful of Mexico's criminal groups, but it has lost some territory and influence to 
its rivals” in recent years, “ including its former enforcement w ing the Zetas” (Insight Crime).  
8  The Zetas w ere largely ex-military personnel, w hich employed military tactics to combat other DTOs across Mexico. How ever, the 
Zetas also predated the local population for economic resources, through extortion, kidnappings and even the occasional homic ide 
(InsightCrime). 
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 In 2009 the government of Felipe Calderon arrested 38 politicians who had alleged ties to La 
Familia. However, they were all released from custody within the following 16 months (Rivera 2009; 
El Universal 2011). These events point to two aspects of the relationship between DTOs and the state 
in Mexico. First, DTOs have been able to infiltrate the political sphere in order to maintain the status 
quo, which allows them to conduct their operation. Second, the government has not been very efficient 
in exercising the rule of law through non-violent means. Nevertheless, the government was able to hurt 
the organizational structure of La Familia Michoacana, as it was evident when a battle between 
government forces and La Familia members in December 2010 led to the alleged killing of “El Chayo” 
Moreno. This led to yet another splinter group from the Familia Michoacana cartel, led by Servando 
“La Tuta” Gomez and Enrique “El Kike” Placarte, what would become known as the Los Caballeros 
Templarios (Knights Templar). Even though at the beginning, the Knights Templar announced that they 
too, wanted to protect the civilian population from other DTOs, with time it became clear that they 
would be just another predatory cartel, extorting, kidnapping, and murdering civilians across the state 
(Althaus and Dudley 2014).  
 By 2012, while not the only cartel in the state, the Knights Templar had control of most of the 
territory of Michoacán. However, their main source of revenue from the sale of illicit  drugs was 
diminished in 2012 due to efficient law enforcement operations across the nation (Althaus and Dudley 
2014). This led the cartel to search for other sources of revenue. Having control over various 
municipalities across Michoacán, the leadership of the Knights Templar decided to extract “taxes” or 
rents from farmers and they even went as far as to charge the civilian population by square footage of 
homes and businesses (Althaus and Dudley 2014). This lead to the creation of self-defense forces 
across Michoacán in early 2013.  
 Similar to the paramilitary wing of the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas, the Cartel Jalisco Nueva 
Generacion (CJNG) was created in 2009 by the Sinaloa Cartel to become its armed wing. However, 
while the Zetas splintered from the Gulf Cartel, the CJNG remains loyal to “el Chapo” Guzman and its 
associates (Excelsior 2013). In 2011, the CJNG published a video in which they argued that the group 
was not simply just another cartel. In the video, the CJNG pledged to fight the Knight Templars,  and 
other cartels in the states of Michoacán and Guerrero, in order to protect the civilian population that 
had suffered from the extortions and kidnappings by predatory criminals (Blog Del Narco 2011). 
Confrontations between the CJNG and the Knights Templar in the state of Michoacán were reported as 
early as April 2012. In addition, some self-defense forces across Michoacán have had alleged support 
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from the CJNG (Excelsior 2013).9  
Figure 1: Presence of Knights Templar and Self-defense groups in Michoacán (2014) 
 
Source: Animal politico  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
9   Due to the rapid demise of the Knights Templar criminal monopoly in the state during 2013 and 2014, by mid-2015 the DTO 
configuration of Michoacán had dramatically changed. In addition to the Knights Templar, w hich still have some influence in the region, four 
other criminal organizations have been fighting to f ill the pow er vacuum left by the demise of the Knights Templar. These groups are: the 
CJNG, the Viagras, the “El Gallito”, La Tercera Hermandad, and the Familia Michoacana (Sánchez Valdés 2015).  
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Criminal Groups in Guerrero 
 
 Mainly attributed to the increasing number of DTOs operating in the territory, violence in the 
state has increased dramatically in the past decade (Kyle 2015). However, throughout the 1990s the 
population saw acts of violence perpetrated by groups other than DTOs, and due to the inability of the 
Mexican government to enforce the rule of law, the state saw the emergence of community police 
forces already in the early 1990s (Estrada Castañon 2014). The indigenous population of the state have 
a long history of struggle for recognition, which has led to some instances of violent confrontation 
against state forces, as it was the case with the guerrilla movement led by the Ejercito Popular 
Revolucionario (EPR) in 1996 (Sierra 2014). The gravest confrontation between the EPR and state 
security forces took place in 1998; in what came to be known as the Masacre del Charco (Massacre of 
el Charco), 11 people lost their lives, 5 were wounded, and 22 were arrested (El Contralinea 2013).  
 Although it is not completely clear when DTOs started their operation in Guerrero, Kyle (2015) 
identified four distinct periods of criminal operations across the state. First, in the mid -1990s, the 
Beltran Leyva Organization worked closely with Armando Carriollo Fuentes and later with Joaquin “El 
Chapo” Guzman10, to expand their lucrative business to the state of Guerrero. Although little is known 
about this period, what is clear is that the levels of violence remained relatively low until 2005. The 
second period started in 2005, when the leader of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cárdenas, together with the 
commander of the Zetas, Hiriberto Lazcano, decided to challenge the Beltran Leyva Organization for 
the control of the state of Guerrero (Seguridad, Justicia y Paz 2014, 36). It is in this period that the first 
reports of DTO violence emerged (Kyle 2015). The Beltran Leyva Organization created a new cell 
under the command Edgar Valdez Villareal, called “The Pelones” (the baldheaded), in order to fight the 
incursion of foreign DTOs in the state.  However, the confrontation between these two groups produced 
a relatively low number of DTO casualties. The main targets were government officials that had ties to 
either organization (Kyle 2015, 8). This period, however, saw the first public display of mutilated 
bodies by DTOs in the state of Guerrero, a tactic of intimidations that would become common in years 
to follow. Though brutal, these confrontations did little to diminish the power of the Beltran Leyva 
Organization across the state (Kyle 2015, 19). A real challenge to the status quo came in 2008 with a 
                                                                 
10                  Armando Carriollo Fuentes w as the leader of the Juarez Cartel at the time, w hile Joaquin Guzman w as the leader of the 
Sinaloa Cartel.  
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conflict between the Beltran Leyva brothers and Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, leader of the Sinaloa 
cartel (Seguridad, Justicia y Paz 2014). Since Guerrero was the home territory of the Beltran Leyva, 
they were able to maintain control of most of the territory. However, this set the stage for the violence 
that was to increase from 2009 onwards (Kyle 2015, 19).  
 The third period of violence took place after the Beltran Leyva brothers created their own DTO, 
separating themselves from the Sinaloa Cartel. This led not only to the escalation in levels of violence, 
but also to a change in the geographic distribution of drug-related violence within the state of Guerrero. 
The violence moved from the urban areas across the coastal region into the mountainous interior of the 
country (Kyle 2015). In Acapulco, the stronghold of the Beltran Leyva Organization, the cartel had 
little difficulty in fending off competition. However, in the adjacent regions the increasing number of 
criminal groups led to a high increase in drug-related violence from 2009 onward (Kyle 2015).  
 The fourth and current period of violence started with the killing of Arturo Beltran Leyva, 
leader of the Beltran Leyva Cartel, in December 2009, which led the group to splinter. While Edgar 
Valdez Villareal attempted to reunite the Sinaloa Cartel with the various local DTOs, the new leader of 
the Beltran Leyva Cartel, Hector Beltran Leyva, found willing partners with the Zetas. However, 
Valdez Villareal was unable to reunite with the Sinaloa Cartel, and was arrested on August 30, 2010. In 
the meantime, La Familia Michoacana started to gain influence across Guerrero, especially in the 
Tierra Caliente region and portions of El Norte region (Seguridad, Justicia y Paz 2014). By January 
2011 the landscape of DTOs in Guerrero had changed dramatically. While some former allies of the 
Beltran Leyva remained loyal to their former bosses, others followed Valdez Villareal. In turn, after 
Valdez was captured, some of his associates found willing partners with large DTOs, while others 
remained with no alliance or affiliation to any other DTO. These numerous smaller groups did not have 
the capabilities to engage in large scale sale or production of illicit drugs. Instead, the groups have been 
able to survive through predatory behavior towards the local population of the area where they operate 
(Kyle 2015). In addition, they have engaged in previously unseen levels of violence against state 
security forces and rival DTOs11.   
                                                                 
11   These new  DTOs are: in the Acapulco region - Cartel Independiente de Acapultco, La Barredora, and Beltrand Layva;  in the 
Costa Grande region – the Guardia Gurerrense and Los Caballeros Templarios; in the Tierra Caliente region – Los Caballeros Templarios 
and Familia Michoacana; in El Centro region – Los Rojos and Los Ardillos; In the El Norte region – Familia Michoacana and Guerreros 
Unidos; The tw o remaining regions of La Montaña and Costa Chica do not have a dominant DTO in the region, how ever, these regions have 
traditionally been narcotic producing zone of the region, but are largely inaccessible and are controlled by local indigenous groups (Kyle 
2015).  
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Figure 2: Criminal organizations operating in Guerrero (2012) 
 
Source: Milenio 
 
 It is during this last period that the exploitation of the local population reached a level not seen 
before. Kidnappings and extortions, which were not unknown to the Beltran Leyva Organization, 
evolved into large-scale operations. Violence became even more gruesome and extensive as part of a 
strategy to deter would be challengers and supporter of other DTOs (Kyle 2015). Guerrero's new DTOs 
use violence in order to induce the local population to cooperate. They have become more openly 
predatory than any DTO seen before in the region (Kyle 2015), which has had a direct impact on the 
lives of the general population of Guerrero.  
 
 
 
 
